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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Appellee/Respondent, : Case No. 20041118-SC 
v. : Ct. App. No. 20030817-CA 
RICHARD FRANKLIN NORRIS, : 
Appellant/Petitioner. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ON CERTIORARI REVIEW 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
By order dated April 19, 2005, this Court granted petitioner's request for certiorari 
review of the court of appeals' unanimous, unpublished decision in State v. Norris, 2004 UT 
App 452,2004 WL 2749484 ("Norris IF) (decision attached in Addendum A). This Court 
has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Is the Utah communications fraud statute overbroad under the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution?1 
'The same issue is currently before this Court on certiorari review in another case 
involving the same defendant and different charges. See State v. Norris, Case No. 
20040880-SC. 
Standard of Review. On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the court of 
appeals, not of the trial court. See State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1997); State v. 
Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196,1199 (Utah 1995). Whether a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad 
is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 
14,lf5,86P.3d735. 
Issue 2: The State appealed a circuit court judge's dismissal of misdemeanor charges 
related to this case, then obtained voluntary dismissal of the appeal. Did the district court 
have jurisdiction to accept a related felony information filed two days after premature issuance 
of the remittitur in the misdemeanor appeal where the self-executing nature of the court of 
appeals' judgment left a valid order of dismissal in the circuit court which, upon issuance of 
the remittitur, ended the circuit court case? 
Standard of Review: Whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness with no deference to the lower court. See Beaver 
County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, f 8 31 P.3d 1147. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
§ 76-10-1801. Communications fraud—Elements—Penalties 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain 
from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly 
with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or 
artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300; 
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(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud 
is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be 
measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to be obtained 
by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense 
described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in Subsection (1) 
to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing of value is not a necessary 
element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or concealing a 
scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of communication 
fraud. 
(6)(a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, convey, make 
known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or to transmit 
information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, telephone, 
telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted 
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
Laws 1985, c. 157, § 2; Laws 1990, c. 79, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 291, § 24, eff. May 1, 1995. 
(In Addendum B). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. The criminal conduct giving rise to these proceedings occurred from March through 
June, 1993 (R. 0165). 
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2. The West Valley City attorney initially charged defendant in December 1994 with 
four misdemeanor counts of communications fraud in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
1801(1) in the Third Circuit Court, West Valley Department (R. 0165, 0384, 0621-22). 
3. In February 1996, on defendant's motion to quash the misdemeanor charges, the 
circuit court judge dismissed the charges because that the aggregate of the four counts 
exceeded the circuit court's jurisdictional limit of $1,000 (R. 0165, 0387-88, 0678-83). 
4. The West Valley City Attorney appealed the dismissal to the Utah Court of Appeals 
(R. 0165, 0388, 0700-08). 
5. In October 1996, the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office ["DA's office"] charged 
defendant in the Third District Court with eleven felony counts of communications fraud (R. 
0165, 0176, 0232, 0392, 0730-35). 
6. Defendant moved to quash the felony charges because the West Valley appeal was 
still pending (R. 0166, 0393-94, 0740). Judge Palmer granted the motion and dismissed the 
charges without prejudice on December 10,1996, noting that the State could refile the charges 
upon dismissal of the misdemeanor appeal (R. 0166, 0232, 0394, 0740). 
7. The State immediately sought to dismiss the appeal (R. 0201-02, 0394, 0742). 
Defendant actively opposed the dismissal because of the prosecutor's intent to file felony 
charges, but the appellate court dismissed the appeal on March 26,1997 (R. 0785,0788-89). 
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8. In early April, 1997, ten of the felony charges were re-filed on the belief that the 
misdemeanor appeal had been dismissed (R. 1-6).2 
9. Defendant, through counsel, moved to dismiss the felony charges on April 10,1997, 
arguing that the necessary remittitur had not issued (R. 23-48). Judge Dever granted 
defendant's motion and again dismissed the charges without prejudice (R. 1860: 27). 
10. Defendant, pro se, sought dismissal of the charges withprejudice two weeks later 
(R. 68-80). He did not file supplemental documents to support his motion until three months 
later (R. 84-103). 
11. The remittitur issued May 13, 1997 (R. 82), and the DA's office refiled twenty 
felony communications fraud charges on May 15,1997 (R. 2-11). In the meantime, defendant 
asked the Court of Appeals to reconsider the dismissal of the appeal (R. 790, 1066-67). 
Defendant also filed a petition for writ of certiorari (R. 1067), then filed an extraordinary writ 
to recall the remittitur because it issued prior to expiration of the time for filing the petition 
for writ of certiorari (R. 210, 214, 791-92, 796, 1066-67). 
12. At the same time, defendant filed in the district court on May 20,1997, a motion 
to strike the most recent information (R. 35-80; R. 1864:4). 
2The record consists largely of pleadings and transcripts from district court case 
no. 971008355, from which this appeal arises. There is also a pleading file and transcript 
from the immediately preceding case, no. 971005698. Few citations to the latter case are 
necessary and will be indicated in this brief in bold typeface. 
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13. Defendant's request for an extraordinary writ prompted the Utah Supreme Court 
to order recall of the remittitur on June 26,1997 (R. 0398,0792,0795). The Court of Appeals 
recalled its remittitur by order dated June 30,1997, and defendant sought certiorari review of 
the dismissal of the original appeal in both the Utah Supreme Court and the United States 
Supreme Court (R. 0398-99, 0792, 0795). Both courts denied certiorari review, and the case 
was again remitted to the trial court on October 30, 1998 (R. 0166-67, 0216, 0233, 0399, 
0406,0792-93,0831). 
14. While pursuing certiorari review of the misdemeanor appeal, defendant, through 
counsel, again sought dismissal of the felony charges in the district court on September 26, 
1997 (R. 109). 
15. On November 19, 1997, after several additional filings and appearances by 
defendant in the trial court, and while the certiorari proceedings were under way in the 
misdemeanor appeal, Judge Dever denied defendant's multiple motions to dismiss with 
prejudice, denied his motion to strike the information, and declared that he would entertain 
no further hearings, motions or argument until the misdemeanor appeal was once again 
remitted (R. 1864: 1-4; 1865). 
16. After the final remittitur issued, Judge Dever again denied defendant's motion to 
dismiss on December 4, 1998, and set the case for preliminary hearing (R. 153).3 
3Judge Dever signed the order on February 2, 1999 (R. 0402, 1008), and defendant 
unsuccessfully attempted to appeal that decision and to obtain certiorari review in the 
Utah Supreme Court (R. 0402-03, 1010-14, 1016). 
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17. The preliminary hearing occurred February 3 and 26,1999 (R. 1866,1867). The 
State dismissed eight of the twenty charges when four victims did not appear at the 
preliminary hearing (R. 0151; R. 1868: 27). Defendant was bound over on the remaining 
twelve charges (R. 1868: 36-37). 
18. Following the bindover, the State filed an amended information to accurately 
reflect the remaining twelve felony counts (R. 218-23). 
19. Defendant sought and obtained new counsel and, in the months prior to the 
November 17,1999 trial setting, filed several pre-trial motions, both through counsel and pro 
se (R. 159-217,240-45,264-68,270-72,273-82,305-17,319-27,328-52,364-1123). Only 
one—a request for supplemental discovery—was granted (R. 1873: 45-51, 69-70; 80-84). 
The last of his motions, which included a repeated request for substitute counsel, were denied 
the morning of trial (R. 364-1123; R. 1536:2-10,12-22,24)). 
20. The court recessed after disposing of the pre-trial matters. When it reconvened, 
defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to counts I and III of the amended information (R. 
1536: 25-26, 53-54). The remaining counts were dismissed. 
21. Two weeks later, on December 1, 1999, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty 
pleas and again requested appointment of counsel (R. 1203-79,1280-1333). He also sought 
new counsel through a petition for an extraordinary writ, which the court of appeals denied 
as frivolous on its face (R. 1457-77). 
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22. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive terms on each of the two felony counts 
(R. 1481-88). He sought a certificate of probable cause which the trial court later denied, 
along with the motion to withdraw the pleas (R. 1489-95, 1519-21; docket #2 at 19). 
23. Defendant timely appealed his conviction and sentence, and the court of appeals 
reversed and remanded the case based on possible confusion in the terms of the plea bargain 
(R. 1592-97). 
24. On remand, defendant withdrew his guilty pleas, and the matter was set for a 
seven-day trial (R. 1614-16). 
25. Defendant again filed a series of motions (R. 1639-41,1643-48,1649-1781). The 
trial court granted defendant additional time, and the State responded to each motion (R. 
1633-34, 1782-1804). Thereafter, the trial court denied the motion to recall the warrant and 
vacate bail (R. 1809). Several motions were not ruled on because of the subsequent entry of 
defendant's pleas. 
26. On September 8, 2003, defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to two charges 
of attempted communications fraud, both class A misdemeanors, reserving for appeal the 
"narrow issues of the constitutionality of the charging statute and jurisdictional issues 
previously raised with the Court and presently the subject of the appeal from judgment in the 
Fourth District Court case, which is presently on appeal" (R. 1814-22; 1827-28).4 The trial 
4Defendant did not challenge the validity of his guilty plea on appeal. 
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court conducted a rule 11 colloquy, and defendant executed his supporting affidavit (R. 1814-
22; R. 1883:2-18). 
27. Defendant was sentenced the same day to two terms of one year in jail, received 
credit for time served and was released (R. 1823-26, 1827-28). 
28. Defendant timely appealed to this Court (R. 1829-30). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS5 
Defendant purported to operate a business that sold diet products (R. 0607, 0648; R. 
1866: 11, 36, 57-58, 69, 75-76, 115). During the spring of 1993, defendant ran ads in Utah 
newspapers promising a $ 1400.00 per month salary and benefits for diet consultants (R. 0608, 
0610-12, 0647-48; R. 1866: 8-11, 69, 95, 101). When someone answered an ad, defendant 
would give a presentation and produce several contracts relating to the diet products (R. 0608, 
0610, 0613; R. 1866:9-12, 58, 95-97). Defendant purported to explain the terms of the 
contracts and obtained signatures from several people (R. 0608, 0611, 0613; R. 1866:12-13, 
15,31-32). While the individuals believed they were agreeing to take delivery of the product 
to sell in conjunction with consulting, they were instead signing contracts to purchase the diet 
products themselves (R. 0608-11, 0614, 0648; 1866: 12-13, 17, 104-05, 117). Defendant 
directed the individuals to use the product so as to have first hand knowledge of it, then 
5The facts underlying defendant's convictions are not relevant to resolution of the 
questions presented for certiorari review. Hence, the State provides a minimal synopsis 
of the facts which it takes from the amended information (R. 218-23) and the preliminary 
hearing transcript (R. 1866 & 1867). 
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refused attempts to return the product, in part because it had been opened (R. 0608, 0612, 
0648;R. 1866:12-13,17-18,53,59-60,118-19). Despite defendant's promises in the ad and 
in person, the victims in this case received no salary, received none of the promised benefits, 
and incurred unanticipated debt (R. 0608,0648; R. 1866:12,18,32,42-43,110-11,61,76-77, 
99-100, 110-11, 115, 117-18). Defendant then sued the victims in small claims court for 
alleged breach of the contracts when the individuals refused or could not afford to pay for the 
diet products (R. 0648; R. 19, 63-64, 74, 78, 79-80, 100, 119, 136). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: Relying on the analysis contained in a recently-published decision 
involving different communications fraud charges filed against this defendant, the court of 
appeals properly determined that the communications fraud statute is not constitutionally 
overbroad. A law that targets harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct may nevertheless 
be challenged as unconstitutional if it also prohibits a substantial amount of conduct protected 
by the First Amendment. The First Amendment does not, however, protect false statements 
that are made intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth. Utah's statute 
punishes only those falsehoods or material omissions made intentionally, knowingly, or with 
reckless disregard for the truth. Accordingly, Utah's communications fraud statute does not 
reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct and is not constitutionally 
overbroad. 
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POINT II; The district court had jurisdiction over the criminal conduct at issue herein 
at all times. The circuit court recognized that fact when it dismissed the misdemeanor charges 
because the aggregate of the four counts exceeded the circuit court's jurisdictional limit of 
$1,000. The court of appeals recognized that fact in its order granting the State's voluntary 
dismissal of the misdemeanor appeal (R. 0785). Defendant fails to support his assumption 
that the district court's jurisdiction is dependent upon the validity of the circuit court's 
jurisdiction. He fails to establish his claim that the district court did not have jurisdiction over 
the filing of the felony information in the district court two days after issuance of the 
premature remittitur in the misdemeanor appeal because the remittitur did not revest 
jurisdiction in the circuit court. Consequently, there is no flaw in the district court's 
jurisdiction over the felony information filed on May 15, 1997. 
Alternatively, the court of appeals correctly rejected defendant's claim that the district 
court lacked jurisdiction because the remittitur failed to revest jurisdiction in the circuit court. 
Based on this Court's analysis in Chase Manhattan Bank v. Principal Funding Corp, the 
court of appeals properly concluded that the appellate court's dismissal of the misdemeanor 
appeal on the State's motion constituted a self-executing judgment. That ruling left intact the 
lower court's order of dismissal from which the appeal had been taken, leaving nothing more 
for the circuit court judge to do upon remittitur. Consequently, the lower court's dismissal 
order became valid upon issuance of the remittitur, ending the circuit court case and leaving 
no jurisdictional barrier to the felony filing of related charges in the district court two days 
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later. The subsequent recall of the remittitur did not change the validity of the district court 
filing, and the district court properly stayed further action pending defendant's continued 
attempts to obtain certiorari review of the State's dismissed misdemeanor appeal. 
Defendant's additional argument concerning the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine is 
outside the scope of this court's grant of certiorari and should not be reviewed. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE IS NOT OVERBROAD 
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 
The court of appeals' decision in this case regarding defendant's constitutional 
overbreadth challenge rested on an opinion published during this appeal in a case in which 
the same defendant made the same challenge to the same statute following his conviction of 
unrelated communications fraud charges. See State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 452, 24 WL 
2749484 ("Norris IF) (relying on State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, ffif 8-16, 97 P.3d 732 
("Norris i")). In Norris /, the court of appeals "concludefd] that the communications fraud 
statute is not overbroad on its face." Norris /, 2004 UT App 267, ffif 7-11 (attached in 
Addendum C). The court observed that the statute does not prohibit all falsehoods or 
material omissions, but "only those where an individual seeks 'to defraud another or to obtain 
from another money, property, or anything of value.'" Id. at ^ 11 (quoting Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-1801(1)(1999)). The court also noted that the statute prohibits only those falsehoods 
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or material omissions that are "'made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless 
disregard for the truth. ™Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801(7)). The Court observed 
that the statute thus "draws the distinction between criminal and innocent behavior" with a 
mens rea consistent with the standard set forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 279 n.19, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964). Norris /, 2004 UT App 267, Tf 11. As such, the court 
concluded, section 76-10-1801 is not substantially overbroad and should not be invalidated. 
Id 
Defendant contends that the ruling is erroneous, arguing that the statute is 
constitutionally overbroad because it punishes the making of "any intentional or recklessly 
uttered falsehood designed to obtain something of value" even in the absence of any intent 
to defraud. Pet Br. at 15-19. This broad scope, he argues, punishes a "significant amount[] 
of constitutionally protected speech[,]" rendering the statute overbroad. Id. 
To the contrary, the ruling in Norris /, acknowledged and applied in this case, is 
accurate. 
A, THE OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE 
Generally, "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not 
challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to 
others in situations not before the Court." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,767, 102 S.Ct. 
3348, 3360 (1982); accord State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1987). The First 
Amendment doctrine of overbreadth is an exception to this rule, permitting a defendant "to 
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challenge a statute on behalf of others not before the court even if the law could be 
constitutionally applied to the defendant." Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14, f 10, 
86 P.3d 735 (quotation omitted). 
Statutory overbreadth "addresses the issue of whether 'the statute in question is so 
broad that it may not only prohibit unprotected behavior but may also prohibit constitutionally 
protected activity as well.',! State v. Hall, 905 P.2d 899,901 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting State 
v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 183, 192 (Utah 1987)) (additional quotation omitted); see also 
Hoffman, 733 P.2d at 505. 
A person claiming overbreadth "bears the burden of demonstrating, 'from the text of 
[the law] and from actual fact,1 that substantial overbreadth exists." Virginia v. Hicks, 539 
U.S. 113,119,123 S.Ct. 2191, 2198 (2003) (quoting New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City 
ofNew York,4&lU.S. 1,14,108 S.Ct. 2225 (1988)). The claimant must demonstrate that the 
statute," taken as a whole, is substantially overbroad judged in relation to its plainly legitimate 
sweep." Id. (emphasis in original). "In short, there must be a realistic danger that the statute 
itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not 
before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds." Members of the City 
Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801, 104 S.Ct. 
2118, 2126 (1984) (emphasis added). Defendant has demonstrated no such danger. 
The overbreadth doctrine is "strong medicine," in light of the fact that it acts to 
invalidate "all enforcement" of a law which otherwise targets "harmful, constitutionally 
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unprotected conduct." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916 
(1973); see also Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119, 123 S.Ct. at 2197 (quotation and citation omitted). 
"The scope of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, like most exceptions to established 
principles, must be carefully tied to the circumstances in which facial invalidation of a statute 
is truly warranted." Ferber, 4580J.S. at 769, 102 S. Ct. at 3361. Consequently, "[o]nly a 
statute that is substantially overbroad may be invalidated on its face." City of Houston v. Hill, 
482 U.S. 451,458,107 S. Ct. 2502,2508 (1987) (citation omitted). It is not enough "that one 
can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute[.]" Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 
U.S. at 800, 104 S.Ct. at 2126. The overbreadth must be real and substantial. See Ashcroft 
v. A.C.L.U., 535 U.S. 564, 584, 122 S.Ct. 1700, 1713 (2002) (citingBroadrick, 413 U.S. at 
615). This is "particularly [true] where conduct and not merely speech is involved," as is the 
case here. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615. Therefore, to prevail on an overbreadth claim, 
defendant carries a "heavy burden." McConnell v. Federal Election Comm 'n, 540 U.S. 93, 
207, 124 S. Ct. 619, 697 (2004). He must demonstrate that "(1) the statute 'reaches a 
substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct,' even if the statute also has a 
legitimate application, and (2) the statute is not 'readily subject to a narrowing construction.'" 
Thompson, 2004 UT 14, f 11 (quoting Hill, 482 U.S. at 458, 107 S. Ct. at 2508, and State v. 
Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Utah 1983) (other citations omitted)). 
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Moreover, courts "afford statutes a strong presumption of constitutionality, and will, 
whenever possible, construe a statute so as to save it from constitutional infirmities." I.M.L. 
v. State, 2002 UT 110, ^  25, 61 P.3d 1038 (citations omitted). 
R THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE IS NOT OVERBROAD 
WHERE IT REACHES ONLY UNPROTECTED SPEECH 
Section 76-10-1801 provides: 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material 
omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any 
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is 
guilty of [communications fraud.] 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted 
were made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for 
the truth. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) & (7) (1999). This section falls within those statutes that 
prohibit "conduct—even if expressive—fall[ing] within the scope of otherwise valid criminal 
laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, 
constitutionally unprotected conduct." See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615, 93 S. Ct. at 2917; see 
also Pet. Br. at 21 (recognizing the government's legitimate interest in preventing fraud). 
"Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown 
extent, there comes a point where that effect—at best a prediction—cannot, with confidence, 
justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute 
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against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe." Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615, 
93 S. Ct. at 2917-18. Such is the case with section 76-10-1801. Indeed, a review of the 
statute reveals that there is no overbreadth. 
1. Falsehoods Made Intentionally, Knowingly, or With Reckless 
Disregard for the Truth have No First Amendment Protection 
The question before this Court is whether the communications fraud statute can 
"conceivably be applied" to prohibit constitutionally protected conduct or expression. See 
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 767, 102 S. Ct. at 3360. Defendant claims it can because the statute is so 
broad as to permit a conviction based on a falsehood uttered without an intent to defraud, 
thereby "applying] to virtually all intentionally or recklessly uttered falsehoods, regardless 
of whether they are fraudulent[.]" Pet. Br. at 20. He further argues that the statute is so broad 
as to risk chilling free speech because it has^  '"no core of easily identifiable and 
constitutionally proscribable conductf.]"' Pet. Br. at 21-22. 
Both arguments fail, however. The statute does not prohibit all falsehoods or material 
omissions, but only those that are "made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a 
reckless disregard for the truth." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(7). It is this mens rea 
element that insulates the communications fraud statute from overbreadth under the First 
Amendment because such falsehoods enjoy no First Amendment protection. 
The First Amendment affords a measure of protection to "some" falsehoods in order 
to provide the breathing space necessary for the exercise of folly protected speech, or "speech 
that matters." BE & K Construction Co. v. N.L.R.B., 536 U.S. 516, 531, 122 S. Ct. 2390, 
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2399 (2002) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welsh Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341-42, 94 S. Ct. 2997 
(1974)) (emphasis added in BE & K). Nevertheless, "[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or 
otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake." Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1830 (1976); 
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339, 94 S. Ct. at 3007 ("[Tjhere is no constitutional value in false 
statements of fact"). Consequently, certain classes of speech "ha[ve] never been thought to 
raise any Constitutional problem." Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,471 -
72,62 S. Ct. 766,769 (1942). Falsehoods uttered intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless 
disregard for their truth fall within one of those unprotected classes. See Garrison v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75, 85 S. Ct. 209, 216 (1964); see also I.M.L., 2002 UT 110 at U 13 
('"[E]ven where the utterance is false, the great principles of the Constitution which secure 
freedom of expression in this area preclude attaching adverse consequences to any except the 
knowing or reckless falsehood.'" (quoting Garrison, 379 U.S. at 73, 85 S. Ct. at 215)). 
In New York Times, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not permit 
civil recovery for a defamatory falsehood unless "the [false] statement was made with 'actual 
malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was 
false or not." 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S. Ct. 710, 726 (1964). The court of appeals here 
concluded that because the mens rea requirement for communications fraud is consistent with 
that required under New York Times, the statute "cannot be said [to be] 'substantially 
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overbroad."' Norris I, 2004 UT App 267, \ 11 (quoting Hill, 482 U.S. at 458, 107 S. Ct. at 
2502). 
Defendant seeks to limit the holding in New York Times to "its context of civil libel" 
and claims that it is inapposite to a criminal fraud situation such as the one present in this 
case. Pet. Br. at 19-20. However, defendant fails to acknowledge the United States Supreme 
Court's application of New York Times to a criminal context. 
The same year New York Times issued, the U.S. Supreme Court issued Garrison v. 
Louisiana, in which the Court expressly acknowledged the "differing history and purposes of 
criminal libel," and concluded that the New York Times mens rea standard for civil libel cases 
applies in the criminal context. See Garrison, 379 U.S. at 67, 85 S. Ct. at 212. Garrison 
recognized that "even where [an] utterance is false, the great principles of the Constitution 
which secure freedom of expression in this area preclude attaching adverse consequences to 
any except the knowing or reckless" Id. at 73, 85 S. Ct. at 215 (emphasis added). The Court 
stated that the reasons which led to the knowing or reckless requirement in New York Times 
"apply with no less force merely because the remedy is criminal." Id. at 74, 85 S. Ct. at 215-
16. The Court then determined that "[t]he constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression 
compel application of the same standard to the criminal remedy." Id. at 74, 85 S. Ct at 216. 
Although Garrison involved a criminal libel statute, the Supreme Court's analysis 
made clear that knowing or reckless falsehoods enjoy no First Amendment protection, 
whatever the context. The Court recognized that an inaccurate but honest utterance may 
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contribute to the "fruitful exercise of the right of free speech" and warrant protection. Id. at 
75, 85 S. Ct. at 216. The Court noted that "erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, 
and . . . it must be protected [by the First Amendment] if the freedoms of expression are to 
have the 'breathing space5 that they 'need . . . to survive[.]'" Id. at 74, 85 S. Ct. at 216 
(quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72, 84 S. Ct. at 721). 
On the other hand, calculated falsehoods "put a different cast on the constitutional 
question" because such falsehoods are "at once at odds with the premises of democratic 
government and with the orderly manner in which economic, social, or political change is to 
be effected." Id. The Court thus concluded that "[calculated falsehood falls into that class 
of utterances which 'are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight 
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.'" Id. (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 
at 572, 62 S. Ct. at 769). "Hence," the Court held, "the knowingly false statement and the 
false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional 
protection. " Id. (emphasis added); see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339, 94 S. Ct. at 3007. 
Garrison controls here. As observed by the Court of Appeals in Norris /, the 
communications fraud statute imposes criminal sanctions only where the falsehoods are made 
"intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth." 2004 UT App 267, If 
11; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (7). Garrison held that even in a criminal setting, 
such speech enjoys no First Amendment protections. Accordingly, and regardless of any 
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additional element that may define or limit the offense, "it cannot be said that [the 
communications statute] is'substantially overbroad' " Norris /,2004 UT App 267 at \\ 1 
(quoting Hill, 482 U.S. at 458, 107 S. Ct. at 2502). 
2. Neither the "Artifice" Nor the "Anything of Value" Provision 
Renders the Communications Fraud Statute Overbroad 
Defendant's analysis of the communications fraud statute takes issue with the term 
"artifice" and the phrase "anything of value." Pet. Br. at 15-19. He argues that the statute's 
use of the term "artifice" provides no limitation on the scope of the statute because "an artifice 
always underlies any dishonest communication." Id. at 15-16. Similarly, he argues that use 
of the phrase "anything of value" encompasses "a virtually limitless array of dishonest 
statements or behaviors or omissions." Id. at 16. 
He then presents several hypotheses that he claims establish the statute's overbreadth, 
arguing that the statute would permit criminal prosecution of an intentional or reckless 
falsehood made to increase product sales or votes {id. at 16-17, 20) and an intentional 
falsehood made to obtain a date or to prevent embarrassment (id. at 17—lying about one's 
weight or political affiliation). 
(a) The Principle That Intentional, Knowing, and 
Reckless Falsehoods are Not Protected is 
Dispositive 
However, the principle that intentional, knowing, and reckless falsehoods are not 
protected is dispositive. So long as the falsehoods are made or omissions occur intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly, they are not protected, regardless of the object of the fraud or the 
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subject of the speech. Hence, how the statute limits the object of the fraud is irrelevant. 
Whether the object of the fraud is a sale, a vote, a date, or anything of arguable value is 
irrelevant because the intentional, knowing or reckless falsehood or omission by which it was 
obtained is not protected. Similarly, the nature of the speech as well as the specifics of the 
"scheme or artifice" underlying it is irrelevant because the calculated falsehood or omission 
removes it from protected speech. See Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75, 85 S. Ct. at 216. Absent 
protected speech, defendant cannot establish overbreadth. See Hall, 905 P.2d at 901. 
In any event, the overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial speech. See 
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496-97, 102 S. 
Ct. 1186, 1192-93 (1982). Further, the political candidate's statements are not punishable 
under the statute because, as this Court has recognized, the question of whether a candidate 
misrepresented his position is not capable of objective verification and, hence, cannot form 
the basis of a conviction for communications fraud. See West v. Thompson Newspapers, 872 
P.2d 999, 1019 (Utah 1994) ("Whether West actually intended to dupe voters into electing 
him mayor by misrepresenting his position on municipal power is something only West 
himself knows, not something that is subject to objective verification."). 
Defendant also argues that the statute would reach a newspaper columnist's sarcastic, 
intentional false statement of "opinion" intended to improve newspaper sales or human 
behavior, which opinion would amount to a constitutionally-protected political opinion. Pet. 
Br. at 16. As with the other hypotheticals, this one does nothing to further defendant's 
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overbreadth argument. The fact that the object is a change in human behavior or an increase 
in paper sales is irrelevant where the false statements are made intentionally. There is no 
federal or state constitutional protection for opinions that make a false assertion of fact. Cf 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18, 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2705-06 (1990) (neither 
false statements nor opinions that imply a false assertion of fact are protected by the First 
Amendment); West, 872 P.2d at 1015 (article I, sections 1 and 15 of the state constitution 
protect expressions of opinion, but that protection is unavailable when the opinion "states or 
implies facts that are false and defamatory"); see also Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 
1155 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[A] particular statement of opinion may imply a false assertion of fact 
and therefore fall outside the scope of the First Amendment's protection as limited by 
Milkovich"). The fact that it is a false statement intentionally made removes the statement 
from the realm of protected opinion and renders it unprotected speech. See West, 872 P.2d 
at 1015. 
(b) In Any Event, Defendant Does Not have 
Standing to Challenge the "Anything of Value" 
Provision Because He Was Not Convicted of 
That Provision 
In any event, defendant has no standing to mount a constitutional overbreadth 
challenge to the statute's "anything of value" provision. Defendant pled guilty to two counts 
of attempted communications fraud. His sworn statement submitted in support of his pleas 
provides: 
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. . . . The communications supporting the two counts are (1) the newspaper 
advertisement run in the spring of 1993; and (2) the in-person meeting with the 
victim(s) which culminated with the signing of agreements. The artifice 
devised to defraud the victims was to foil their ability to comply with contract 
agreements and then sue and obtain judgments against them. 
(R. 1822) (emphasis added) (attached in Addendum D). In other words, he was convicted 
under the provision of the statute sanctioning a fraudulent scheme "to obtain from another 
money/' not "anything of value." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). As explained by this 
Court in Thompson, a defendant does not have standing to challenge for overbreadth a 
provision of the statute which was not applied to the defendant. See Thompson, 2004 UT 14, 
ffl[ 12-13,18. This Court should not therefore address his challenge to the "anything of value" 
provision.6 
6Defendant includes a separate argument urging this Court to reach his challenge to 
the "anything of value" language, noting that the court of appeals refused to do so. Pet. 
Br. at 23-25. More specifically, the court of appeals found that defendant lacked standing 
to raise a constitutional vagueness challenge to the phrase because his actions did not fall 
within the realm of the phrase. Norris II, 2004 UT App 452 at ^  5 n.3. As explained in 
the text of this section, supra, defendant was convicted under the provision relating to 
obtaining money, not "anything of value." Hence, the court of appeals properly refused 
to reach his vagueness claim. See id,; see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n.7, 102 
S. Ct. at 1191 n.7 ("One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully 
challenge it for vagueness." (quotations and citation omitted)). 
Moreover, this Court did not include defendant's vagueness challenge in its grant 
of certiorari review. See Order dated April 19, 2005. Consequently, the State does not 
address the issue further. 
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POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE FELONY 
CHARGES INDEPENDENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT'S 
JURISDICTION; ALTERNATIVELY, A VALID ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL EXISTED IN THE COURT CASE UPON ISSUANCE OF 
THE REMITTITUR, CONCLUDING THE CIRCUIT CASE AND 
ALLOWING THE FELONY CHARGES TO BE FILED IN THE 
DISTRICT COURT TWO DAYS LATER 
This Court has granted certiorari review on the question of the district court's 
jurisdiction over a felony information involving charges related to the misdemeanor case and 
filed in the district court during the time between issuance and recall of the premature 
remittitur in the misdemeanor appeal. See Order dated April 19, 2005. The issue does not 
involve any concern about the constitutional or statutory propriety of pursuing related charges 
in two different courts because the district court action was stayed pending final resolution 
of the misdemeanor appeal (R. 1864: 1-4; R. 1865). The issue is simply the narrow question 
of the district court's ability to accept the felony filing while the circuit court case existed. 
Because the district court had jurisdiction over the offenses at issue, there was no 
jurisdictional bar to the filing of the felony charges in that court. 
Should this Court deem the remittitur relevant to this issue, it should turn to the 
decision in Chase Manhattan Bank v. Principal Funding Corp,, 2004 UT 9, 89 P.3d 109, for 
direction. Based on Chase, the court of appeals determined that under the circumstances at 
hand, the appellate judgment dismissing the appeal was self-executing, and, upon issuance 
of the remittitur, automatically validated the circuit court's existing order dismissing the 
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circuit court case for lack of jurisdiction, and closed that case without further action of the 
judge. Norris II, 2004 UT App 267, Yh 8-9. Consequently, there was no barrier to the district 
court's acceptance of the felony information two days after issuance of the remittitur in the 
circuit court case. Id. at f^ 9. The court of appeals' ruling properly interprets this Court's 
detailed explanation of the effect of remittitur in Chase. See Chase Manhattan Bank, 2004 
UT9at1f l l . 
A, BOTH THE DISTRICT AND THE CIRCUIT COURTS HAD 
JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIMINAL CONDUCT 
On May 15, 1997—two days after issuance of the premature remittitur in the 
misdemeanor appeal—the DA's office filed a felony information in the district court (R. 2-11) 
(attached in Addendum E). That information involved twenty third-degree-felony counts of 
communications fraud (id). These charges were related to the misdemeanor charges filed 
earlier in the circuit court. Each of the counts alleged that "the value of the loss or the thing 
sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00" (id.). 
Defendant sought to strike the information, filed a motion to dismiss, and submitted 
additional documents in the district court (R. 35-80; R. 1864:4; R. 1865: 8). The district 
court judge held hearings on defendant's motions, but, upon the subsequent recall of the 
remittitur, denied the motions to strike and to dismiss and properly stayed the matter until 
completion of the misdemeanor appeal. Cf. Nielson v. Schiller, Judge, et al., 92 Utah 137,66 
P.2d 365, 368 (1937) (faced with two cases involving the same parties and the same issues 
but filed in two different Utah counties, this Court imposed a stay of proceedings in one court 
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pending completion of the proceedings in the other court where jurisdiction was first 
acquired). 
Defendant argues that the opinion in Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assoc, v. 
Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996), applies in this case to prevent the district 
court from obtaining jurisdiction over the felony information because the circuit court in the 
misdemeanor case did not reacquire jurisdiction due to the premature issuance of the 
remittitur in that case. Pet. Br. at 25-29. He assumes that the inability of the circuit court 
judge to act until jurisdiction was properly revested extended to the district court judge as 
well, preventing the judge from exercising jurisdiction over the felony information which was 
filed while the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. Id. 
Defendant provides no authority for his assumption that the district court's jurisdiction 
is dependent upon the validity of the circuit court's jurisdiction, and the State has found none. 
The fact remains that the district court always had jurisdiction over the felony charges 
outlined in the information, and the information was properly filed in that court. See Utah 
Code Unann. § 78-3-4 (1995) (at the time the offenses occurred, providing the district court 
with original jurisdiction in all criminal matters "not excepted in the Utah Constitution and 
not prohibited by law"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1999) (providing that the offense is 
punishable as "a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained 
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or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $ 1,000 but is less than $5,000").7 Thereafter, as of the 
July, 1996, consolidation of the circuit and district courts, the district court had jurisdiction 
over the charges regardless of their status as felonies or as misdemeanors. See Utah Code 
Unann. § 78-1-2(1) (1997) ("Effective July 1, 1996, . . . [t]he district court shall have 
jurisdiction as provided by law for the district court and shall have jurisdiction over all matters 
filed in the court formerly denominated the circuit court."). Both the court of appeals and the 
circuit court judge in this case recognized that the district court had jurisdiction over the 
criminal conduct at issue in this matter (R. 0165, 0387-88, 0678-83, 0785). 
The timing of the remittitur in the misdemeanor case is a red herring and does not 
affect the district court's jurisdiction over the felony information. The mere filing of the 
felony charges does not prevent the efficient and effective determination of either case: it is 
the pursuit of both cases at the same time that should be avoided. See Nielson, 66 P.2d at 368 
(imposing a stay of the proceedings in the second of two cases involving the same issues and 
the same parties but filed in different district courts to permit the matter to be decided by the 
court first acquiring jurisdiction). That precaution was taken in this case as soon as the 
7The circuit court itself had jurisdiction over the four class A communications 
fraud charges at the time they were filed in that court (R. 621-22) (information attached in 
Addendum E). See Utah Code Unann. § 78-4-5 (1995) (outlining the jurisdiction of the 
circuit court at the time of the charges at issue and providing for jurisdiction over class A 
misdemeanors, most class B misdemeanors, and any misdemeanors related to those 
properly before the court); Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (providing that the offense is 
punishable as a class A misdemeanor "when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000"). 
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district court judge became aware that the remittitur in the misdemeanor case was premature 
(R. 1864: 1-4) (attached in Addendum E). 
Accordingly, the district court in this case had jurisdiction to accept and stay the felony 
information filed on May 15, 1997. 
B, ALTERNATIVELY, A VALID ORDER OF DISMISSAL EXISTED IN THE 
CIRCUIT COURT UPON ISSUANCE OF THE REMITTITUR, CONCLUDING 
THAT CASE AND PERMITTING THE FELONY FILING IN DISTRICT 
COURT 
1. Remittitur in Utah Generally 
"An appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction and transfers it to the appellate court, 
where it remains until the trial court regains jurisdiction." Hi-Country Estates, 942 P.2d at 
306; see also State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, % 39, 37 P.3d 1073; White v. State, 795 P.2d 648, 
649 (Utah 1990) (per curiam). The trial court does not regain jurisdiction "until the appellate 
proceeding terminates." Hi-Country Estates, 942 P.2d at 306; see also Chase Manhattan 
Bank, 2004 UT 9 at \ 9. The appellate proceeding terminates upon issuance of the remittitur. 
See Hi-Country Estates, 942 P.2d at 306; Utah R. App. P. 36. 
Utah treats remittitur as a jurisdictional event. "Remittitur is a formal revesting of 
jurisdiction with the trial court after appellate proceedings and is governed by the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. Utah R. App. P. 36." Chase Manhattan Bank, 2004 UT 9 at \ 9 
("Remittitur is not an order of the appellate court, but merely gives the trial court such 
jurisdiction as it needs to implement the appellate court's decision in the matter." (citing 5 
C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 968 (1993)) (emphasis added); see also Hi-Country Estates, 942 
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P.2d at 306-07. Jurisdiction is returned to the trial court following an appeal only when it 
receives the remittitur from the appellate court. See Chase Manhattan Bank 2004 UT 9 at 
f 9. Thus, until the appellate court relinquishes appellate jurisdiction, the trial court is 
generally prohibited from acting on the case. See id. at fflf 9, 12 n.l. 
Further, this Court has held that one of the extremely limited situations in which an 
appellate court retains jurisdiction to recall a remittitur is where the remittitur issued 
prematurely, as occurred here. See Miller v. Southern Pacific Co., 82 Utah 307,24 P.2d 380, 
381 (1933). E.g., Hi-Country Estates, 942 P.2d at 306 (court of appeals erred in refusing to 
recall premature remittitur). Where a remittitur is prematurely issued, the lower court in the 
case has "no jurisdiction to enter a judgment" and any order or modification it enters before 
receipt of a valid remittitur is void. Hi-Country Estates, 942 P.2d at 307. 
2. Clarification on Remittitur in Chase 
This Court had the opportunity to review its jurisprudence on the effect of remittitur 
in this jurisdiction in Chase Manhattan Bank and found it to be "incomplete^". 2004 UT 9 
at \ 11. The case involved a quiet title suit between the successor-in-interest of the holder of 
a 1994 judgment lien and the successor-in-interest of the holder of a 1996 trust deed on the 
same real property. Id. at ^ 2-5,13. At issue was a court of appeals ruling which purported 
to '"vacate the trial court's judgment'" which had been granted in favor of the judgment lien 
holder. Id. at \ 2. However, the court of appeals' ruling also stated that the court was 
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'"reversing] and remand[ing] for further action consistent with [its] opinion.'" Id. (quoting 
England v. Horbach, 905 P.2d 3015 302 n.l, 305 (Utah App. 1995)). 
This Court determined that resolution of the case rested on the effect of the court of 
appeals' ruling and the related remittitur. Id. at f 7. This Court explained that if the appellate 
ruling was self-executing and vacated the trial court's judgment, then the 1994 judgment lien 
would have been dissolved when the property was sold following default on the 1996 trust 
deed, even though the case was on certiorari review at the time the trust deed issued. Id. at 
fflf 2, 7. However, if the ruling was not self-executing, the judgment lien would have 
remained effective until, upon remittitur and the revesting of jurisdiction, the trial court acted 
to implement the ruling. Id. If the trial court failed to act before this Court granted certiorari, 
the judgment lien would have remained effective and would be superior to the 1996 trust 
deed. Id. 
This Court first acknowledged its own precedent announcing that the judgment of an 
appellate court is not self-executing, but is "'remitted back to the court from which the appeal 
was taken[] for execution of the judgment.'" Id. at *\ 11 (quoting State v. Johnson, 100 Utah 
316, 114 P.2d 1034, 1037 (1941)). The Court then explained that, generally, appellate 
judgments which reverse or qualifiedly affirm a lower court ruling "will almost always require 
further action by the trial court." Id. at If 12. In those cases, the appellate court's 
determination that the lower court ruling should be vacated or dismissed "represent 
expressions of the appellate opinion to be read as the law of the case upon the revesting of 
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jurisdiction in the trial court by remittitur." Id, (quoting Puritan Leasing Co, v. Superior 
Court of Santa Barbara County, 16 Cal.App.3d 140,142 Cal.Rptr. 676,679-80 (1977)). The 
trial court must, therefore, affirmatively act in a manner which effectuates the appellate 
judgment. 
However, the Court also determined that many appellate court judgments are, in fact, 
self-executing. Chase Manhattan Bank, 2004 UT 9 at \ 12. Those include an unqualified 
affirmance of the lower court judgment as well as a reversal or qualified affirmance about 
which the appellate court expressly invokes its constitutional or statutory power "to fully and 
finally dispose of the matter." Id. (citing Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 3 and Utah Code Ann. § 78-
21-3(l)(a) (2002)). In other words, when an appellate court simply affirms the judgment or 
specifically notes that "no further action is required by the trial court," the judgment is self-
executing, even if it reverses or qualifiedly affirms the lower court's ruling. Id, These orders 
are self-executing because "no further order is needed from the trial court. . . . [T]he trial 
court's original order merely remains intact. As a result, the trial court need not act for a valid 
order to be found in the record." Id, at ^  12 (citation omitted). 
The Court's review of the "implications of remittitur" and its recognition of the self-
executing nature of some appellate decisions was possible because the appellate decision at 
issue was rendered under the old version of rule 36, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which 
governed remittiturs. Id. at f 9. The self-executing nature of the appellate judgment would 
not have become an issue under the current version of the rule because, upon the filing of a 
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petition for writ of certiorari, the appellate judgment would automatically be stayed. Id.; Utah 
R. App. P. 36. The old version of the rule, however, permitted a party "to request a stay of 
the issuance of remittitur to prevent further action by the trial court while the party's petition 
for writ of certiorari was pending." Id. Because neither party stayed issuance of the remittitur 
and such a stay was not automatic at that time, this Court was required to look into the self-
executing nature of the appellate judgment to determine what effect that judgment had on the 
lower court upon issuance of the remittitur. Chase Manhattan Bank, 2004 UT 9 at \ 9. In 
other words, the issuance of the remittitur not only provides the trial court with the jurisdiction 
needed to implement a non-self-executing appellate decision, but it automatically activates 
a self-executing appellate decision. Id. at *|ffi 7, 9, 12. 
Consequently, under former rule 36(a)(3), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an 
appellate court's self-executing judgment automatically validates the final order on record in 
the trial court, without further involvement of the lower court, upon remittitur of the case, 
absent any timely request for a stay of the remittitur. It is the former rule which applies in this 
case. 
3. Under Chase, the Appellate Order was Self-Executing and 
Validated the Circuit Court's Order of Dismissal 
In this case, the State sought voluntary dismissal of its misdemeanor appeal, and the 
court of appeals entered an order of dismissal (R. 0201-02, 0394, 0742, 0788-89). Add. F. 
Defendant failed to seek a stay of the remittitur before filing his cert petition to prevent any 
action from occurring in the circuit court from which the misdemeanor appeal arose. The 
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remittitur, however, issued prematurely. Under Chase Manhattan Bank the remittitur would 
prevent implementation of a non-self-executing appellate judgment because it would not 
transfer the jurisdiction necessary to effect implementation. See Chase Manhattan Bank, 2004 
UT 9 at 112. However, this case involves a self-executing judgment, and the court of appeals 
properly interpreted Chase as providing that such a judgment becomes effective upon issuance 
of the remittitur. See Norris II, 2004 UT App 452 at ffif 8-9. Moreover, because a remittitur 
merely confers such jurisdiction as it necessary to implement the appellate decision, and no 
active implementation was required here, the premature issuance of the remittitur did not stay 
the self-execution of the appellate decision. Cf. Chase Manhattan Bank, 2004 UT 9 at j^ 12. 
(a) The Court of Appeals' Judgment was Self-
Executing, Requiring no Further Action by the 
Circuit Court 
The court of appeals' order in this case provided: 
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's motion to stay 
[the appellate order "directing him to file a response to the motion to dismiss" 
by a date certain] is denied and this appeal is dismissed. 
(R. 0785) (attached in Addendum F). This order is indistinguishable fiom the affirmance of 
a trial court's judgment which this Court discussed in Chase. It clearly and unequivocally 
dismissed the appeal without the need for any additional action on the part of the circuit court 
and left the circuit court's dismissal order intact. See Chase Manhattan Bank, 2004 UT 9 at 
If 12. Not only is there no circuit court action required to implement the self-executing 
decision in this case, but there is no post-appeal disposition of any sort to be had. See Utah 
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R. Crim P. 28 (outlining affirmative acts required by lower court following an appellate 
disposition). Hence, the self-executing appellate order becomes folly effective without any 
act whatsoever at the circuit court level. 
Consequently, it was self-executing and "le[ft] the parties in the position they were in 
before the appeal was brought." 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appellate Review § 877 (2005). 
(b) The Remittitur Permitted the Appellate 
Judgment to Execute, Validating the Circuit 
Court Dismissal Order and Ending the Case 
Under Chase Manhattan Bank, had the remittitur issued timely, there would be no 
question but that the circuit court's order of dismissal was validated and would not have 
barred the filing of felony charges in district court. See 2004 UT 9 at ^  7-12. The simple 
fact that the remittitur issued prematurely does not act to prevent the self-executing appellate 
judgment from taking effect under the circumstances of this case. Cf. Hi-Country Estates, 942 
P.2d at 306-07 (recognizing the distinction between the vesting in the lower court of 
jurisdiction to actively implement a non-self-executing appellate decision and preventing or 
staying execution of an appellate decision). 
In this case, the issue is, in essence, whether a premature remittitur can effectively stay 
a self-executing appellate judgment. A remittitur is not an order of the appellate court: it 
simply formally revests in the lower court only that jurisdiction needed to implement the 
appellate court's decision. See Chase Manhattan Bank, 2004 UT 9 at \ 9. While a premature 
remittitur does not permit further action by the lower court with respect to the appellate 
35 
decision, it does nothing to prevent the self-execution of a judgment already made by the 
appellate court, especially where that judgment requires no circuit court action to become 
effective. To hold otherwise would be to elevate a premature remittitur to the position of a 
stay of execution without any basis for doing so. 
Here, the appeal was voluntarily dismissed. See Utah R. App. P. 37. A voluntary 
dismissal "le[aves] the judgment of the circuit court in full force and effect, the same as if no 
appeal had ever been taken." People ex rel Waite v. Bristow, 391 111. 101, 62 N.E.2d 545, 
551 (1945). The parties are left in the position they were in before the appeal was brought. 
See 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appellate Review § 877. The timing of the remittitur does not change the 
nature of the dismissal. 
Defendant relies on Hi-Country Estates, arguing that the existence of a premature 
remittitur nullifies "all actions of a trial court" and prevented district court jurisdiction. Pet. 
Br. at 27-28. However, that reliance is misplaced. The appellate order in that case was not 
self-executing. Instead, it was a qualified order of reversal requiring action by the trial court 
upon remittitur, which action the trial court never obtained jurisdiction to take because the 
remittitur issued prematurely. 942 P.2d at 306. Consequently, the trial court's attempt to 
implement the appellate decision by modifying the judgment which was the subject of the 
appeal was rendered null and void. Id. Moreover, the concerns noted in Hi-Country Estates 
were those resulting from violation of "the rule prohibiting the trial court from exercising 
jurisdiction in a case while it is on appeal." Id. at 307. That rule was neither violated nor at 
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issue in this case. Finally, Hi-Country Estates spoke only to the jurisdiction of the lower 
court from which the appeal came, not to the jurisdiction of other courts. The court of appeals 
properly rejected defendant's reliance on Hi-Country Estates. See Norris II, 2004 UT App. 
452 at 1| 7. 
Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, the remittitur, whether premature 
or timely, simply provides the method by which the lower court is notified of the self-
executing appellate decision and by which the record is returned. There is nothing in the 
timing of the remittitur which would prevent the self-execution of the appellate decision at 
issue here. 
C DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE FILING OF INFORMATIONS 
BEFORE MULTIPLE DISTRICT COURT JUDGES VIOLATED THE 
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION DOCTRINE IS OUTSIDE THE 
SCOPE OF THIS COURT'S GRANT OF CERTIORARI 
Defendant's second point includes an argument that "the refiling [of felony charges] 
before multiple district court judges" violated the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine. Pet. Br. 
at 28-29. The State does not address this claim because the Court did not grant certiorari on 
this issue. 
The law is well-settled that this Court will review on certiorari "'[o]nly the questions 
set forth in the petition or fairly included therein5 and for which certiorari is granted." DeBry 
v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,443 (Utah 1995) (quoting Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4)). In his petition, 
as well as in his brief, defendant included this argument at the end of his argument that the 
premature remittitur prevented the district court from acquiring subject matter jurisdiction 
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over this case. See Pet. for Writ of Certiorari at 19-20; Pet. Br. at 28-29. This Court's grant 
of certiorari on the remittitur issue did not include the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine. 
Instead, the Court granted certiorari on the issue of: 
2. Whether the district court had jurisdiction over felony charges filed after 
remittitur in the related misdemeanor case but before the remittitur was 
recalled. 
The second issue shall not be deemed to include the allegations relating 
to due process, prosecutorial vindictiveness, or any other matter set forth in the 
third question presented by the petition. 
See Order dated April 19, 2005. Accordingly, this Court did not grant certiorari on the 
concurrent jurisdiction issue. Defendant is thus precluded from raising the issue on certiorari. 
Moreover, defendant makes no attempt to argue that there is any overlap in this issue 
and the issue identified in this Court's grant of certiorari review upon which one could fairly 
be said to include the other. He simply points generally to the "filing of the successive 
prosecutions" which occurred while the misdemeanor case was on appeal and mentions by 
case number two district court cases. Pet. Br. at 28-29. 
This Court should not, therefore, address defendant's concurrent jurisdiction claim 
because it is outside the scope of certiorari—the Court did not grant certiorari on the claim, 
and it is not fairly included in the question of the self-executing nature of the appellate court's 
dismissal of the misdemeanor appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
court of appeals' ruling in all respects. 




KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
*1 Defendant Richard F. Norris appeals his 
conviction of attempted communications fraud. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 to 76-10-1801 (1997). 
We affirm. 
In December 1994, West Valley City (West 
Valley) charged Defendant with four misdemeanor 
counts of communications fraud in the Third Circuit 
Court, West Valley Department. [FN1] See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (1994). In February 
1996, the circuit court dismissed the misdemeanor 
charges, ruling that the aggregate of the four 
misdemeanor counts exceeded the circuit court's 
jurisdictional limit of $1000.00. West Valley 
appealed the circuit court's decision. 
FN1. Circuit courts merged into district 
courts on July 1, 1996. See Utah Code 
Ann. §78-1-2(1997). 
On December 10, 1996, because the State was 
prepared to file felony counts of communications 
fraud against Defendant in district court, West 
Valley moved this court to dismiss its appeal. On 
March 26, 1997, this court dismissed the appeal, 
and on May 13, 1997, this court issued a remittitur. 
Two days later, the State filed twenty felony 
charges of communications fraud against Defendant 
in district court. 
Defendant moved to recall the remittitur on the 
ground that it had been issued prematurely because 
Defendant's time to file a petition for certiorari had 
not expired. On June 26, 1997, the Utah Supreme 
Court ordered this court to recall the remittitur, 
which this court did on June 30, 1997. On 
September 26, 1997, Defendant moved the district 
court to dismiss the felony charges because the 
West Valley case was still active. The district court 
did not dismiss the charges, but rather stayed its 
proceedings until all activity in the West Valley 
appeal had ceased. 
After Defendant's petitions for certiorari had been 
denied in both the Utah Supreme Court and the 
United States Supreme Court, this court reissued the 
remittitur on October 30, 1998. Defendant then 
moved the district court to dismiss the felony 
charges, claiming that (i) the communications fraud 
statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, 
and (ii) the district court lacked jurisdiction over the 
May 1997 felony charges because the May 1997 
remittitur was subsequently recalled. The district 
court denied the motions. 
Defendant then entered a conditional plea in which 
Defendant preserved his right to challenge the 
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constitutionality of the communications fraud 
statute and the jurisdiction of the district court to 
hear the felony charges filed in May 1997. 
Defendant appeals these two issues. [FN2] 
FN2. Defendant attempts to raise 
numerous other issues in his briefs. We do 
not address these issues because they 
exceed the scope of what was preserved in 
the conditional plea. Defendant mentions 
plain error in a single paragraph, but fails 
to apply plain error doctrine to any of the 
specific issues raised. Thus, we do not 
address Defendant's plain error argument 
because it is inadequately briefed. See 
Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(5)(B) ("The brief of 
the appellant shall contain ... a statement of 
grounds for seeking review of an issue not 
preserved in the trial court."). 
Defendant argues that the statute under which he 
was charged is unconstitutionally vague and 
overbroad. However, after this appeal was filed, this 
court addressed these specific challenges. See State 
v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267,ffl 8-16, 97 P.3d 732 
(holding that the communications fraud statute is 
neither unconstitutionally overbroad nor 
unconstitutionally vague). Thus, Defendant's 
constitutional challenges to the communications 
fraud statute fail. [FN3] 
FN3. Defendant claims that our prior 
decision did not directly deal with the 
phrase "anything of value," and thus we 
are free to hold that the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague on that basis. 
However, our prior decision did hold that 
"because Defendant was charged with 
devising a scheme to defraud others of 
money, his actions do not fall within the 
anything of value realm, and thus, he may 
not challenge this phrase as 
unconstitutionally vague." State v. Norris, 
2004 UT App 267,1 15, 97 P.3d 732 
(quotations and citations omitted). In this 
case, Defendant also was charged with 
devising a scheme to defraud others of 
money, and thus under the rule articulated 
in Norris, Defendant 
challenge this phrase as 
vague in this case. See id. 
In addition, Defendant's 
State charging multiple 
communication reaches 
already has been decided 
State v. Bradshaw, 2004 
P.3d 359. 
also may not 
unconstitutionally 
challenge to the 
counts when one 
numerous victims 
by this court. See 
UT App 298, 99 
Defendant also challenges the jurisdiction of the 
trial court to hear the felony charges filed in May 
1997. Specifically, Defendant argues that even 
though this court had issued a remittitur in the West 
Valley appeal before the felony charges were filed, 
the remittitur had no effect because it was 
subsequently recalled. We disagree. 
*2 "The determination of whether a court has 
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, 
which we review for correctness, according no 
deference to the district court's determination." 
Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81,f 8, 31 
P.3d 1147. The issue in this case is whether a valid 
order dismissing the misdemeanor charges in the 
West Valley case existed at the time felony charges 
were filed. The parties focus their arguments on 
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n. v. Foothills 
Water Co., 942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996), which held 
that actions taken by a trial court after a remittitur 
issues are void if the remittitur is subsequently 
recalled. See id. at 307. Hi-Country, however, does 
not control the outcome of this case. 
The controlling case is Chase Manhattan Bank v. 
Principal Funding Corp., 2004 UT 9, 89 P.3d 109. 
[FN4] In Chase Manhattan, the court outlined the 
situations in which judgments by appellate courts 
are self-executing. See id. at ^ 11. The court 
concluded that, under the 1997 version of rule 36 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, where "the 
trial court need not act for a valid order to be found 
in the record," the judgment is self-executing unless 
a party specifically requests and is granted a stay of 
the remittitur before it issues. [FN5] Id. at f 12. 
Specifically, the court held that if a judgment by 
this court is self-executing, then a valid order exists 
on the record from the moment the remittitur is 
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issued until it is subsequently recalled. See id. at If 
7. 
FN4. The State cites Nielson v. Schiller, 92 
Utah 137, 66 P.2d 365 (1937), a civil case, 
for the proposition that a second-filed 
action should be stayed until the first-filed 
action has been resolved. See id. at 368. 
Because that case did not involve a 
remittitur, or even an appeal, it does not 
speak directly to the jurisdictional issue in 
this case. Rather, it merely indicates that in 
this case it was proper for the district court 
to issue a stay once it was aware that the 
appeal had been resuscitated. 
FN5. The current rule avoids the odd 
situation in this case by providing that a 
remittitur issues immediately after the time 
for filing a petition for certiorari has 
expired, unless such a petition is filed, in 
which case the remittitur is automatically 
stayed. See Utah R.App. P. 36(a)(2). 
In the West Valley appeal, acting on a motion by 
the appellant, this court dismissed the appeal. 
Dismissal of the West Valley appeal required no 
further action by the circuit court, but rather left in 
place the circuit court's ruling that dismissed the 
misdemeanor charges without prejudice. Thus, 
when the State filed felony charges in district court 
two days after this court issued a remittitur, no 
further action was required in the West Valley case. 
Therefore, a valid judgment existed on the record 
when felony charges were filed. The subsequent 
recall of the remittitur on Defendant's motion did 
not change this fact. See id. at lfl[ 12-13. For this 
reason, the district court did not lack jurisdiction 
when charges were filed in this case. [FN6] 
Therefore, we affirm. 
FN6. Defendant claims that his due 
process rights were violated when the State 
vindictively prosecuted the felony case 
against him, and thus under Blackledge v. 
Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), the due process 
violations strip the district court of 
jurisdiction. However, unlike in 
Blackledge, the record in this case does not 
indicate a "realistic likelihood of 
'vindictiveness,' " id. at 27, because (i) the 
original trial court dismissed the 
misdemeanor charges sua sponte, (ii) the 
appeal was taken by West Valley, not the 
Defendant, (iii) the State indicated its 
intention to file felony charges prior to 
Defendant asking the Utah Supreme Court 
to recall the appeal, and (iv) the State had 
a legitimate reason to file felony charges 
when it did, namely concern over the 
statute of limitations. While the State's 
actions in this case were less than ideal, the 
record does not come close to establishing 
prosecutorial vindictiveness in response to 
Defendant exercising his procedural rights 
on appeal. 
WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Associate 
Presiding Judge and NORMAN H. JACKSON, 
Judge. 
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c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
*i Chapter 10. Offenses Against Public Health, Safety, Welfare, and Morals 
*i! Part 18. Communications Fraud 
-f§ 76-10-1801. Communications fraud—Elements—Penalties 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to 
obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who 
communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose 
of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud 
is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be 
measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought 
to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as 
provided in Subsection (1)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense 
described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in 
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing of 
value is not a necessary element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or concealing a 
scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of 
communication fraud. 
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, convey, make 
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known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or to 
transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, 
telephone, telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and 
written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or 
omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Richard NORRIS, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20020966-CA. 
Aug. 12, 2004. 
Background: Defendant was convicted on his 
unconditional pleas of guilty in the Fourth District 
Court, Provo Department, James R. Taylor, J., of 
three counts of communications fraud, and he 
appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, James Z. Davis, 
J., held that: 
(1) defendant's unconditional guilty plea to 
communications fraud did not operate as waiver of 
his facial constitutional challenge to 
communications fraud statute; 
(2) communications fraud statute was not 
unconstitutionally overbroad; 
(3) term "artifice" as used in communications 
fraud statute was not unconstitutionally vague; and 
(4) term "communicate" as used in 
communications fraud statute, was not 
unconstitutionally vague. 
Affirmed. 
Gregory K. Orme, J., filed concurring opinion. 
Russell W. Bench, Associate P.J., filed opinion 
concurring in result. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Criminal Law €==n 134(3) 
1 lOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases 
The determination of whether a court has subject 
matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which an 
appellate court reviews for correctness. 
[2] Criminal Law €=>1134(3) 
1 lOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases 
Constitutional challenges to statutes present 
questions of law, which the appellate court reviews 
for correctness. 
[3] Constitutional Law €=>48(1) 
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**1 After entering an unconditional, voluntary 
guilty plea to three counts of communications fraud, 
Richard Norris (Defendant) challenges the 
constitutionality of the underlying statute (the 
communications fraud statute) on appeal. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (2003). [FN1] We affirm. 
FN1. Because the communications fraud 
statute has not changed since Defendant 
was charged, we cite to the most current 
version for convenience. 
BACKGROUND 
**2 Defendant was charged with seven counts of 
communications fraud and was bound over on all 
counts. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (2003). 
After several days of trial, Defendant entered an 
unconditional, voluntary guilty plea to three counts 
of third-degree-felony communications fraud. See 
id § 76-10-1801(l)(c). After sentencing, and 
without moving to withdraw his guilty pleas, 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, mounting 
a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the 
communications fraud statute on overbreadth and 
vagueness grounds. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1][2][3] **3 We consider two issues on appeal. 
First, we must determine whether this court has 
subject matter jurisdiction to consider Defendant's 
constitutional challenge after Defendant entered an 
unconditional, voluntary guilty plea. "The 
determination of whether a court has subject matter 
jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review 
for correctness...." Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 
2001 UT 81,H 8, 31 P.3d 1147. Second, if this 
court has jurisdiction, then we must consider 
whether the communications fraud statute is 
unconstitutionally overbroad or vague on its face. 
"Constitutional challenges to statutes present 
questions of law, which we review for correctness." 
Provo City Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14,H 5, 
86 P.3d 735. "When addressing such a challenge, 
this court presumes that the statute is valid, and we 
resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of 
constitutionality." State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24,f 6, 
980P.2dl91. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
[4][5] **4 "The general rule applicable in criminal 
proceedings ... is that by pleading guilty, the 
defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the 
essential elements of the *736 crime charged and 
thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects, 
including alleged pre-plea constitutional 
violations." State v. Parsom, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 
(Utah 1989); see also State v. Hardy, 2002 UT 
App 244,f 13, 54 P.3d 645. The State asserts that 
Defendant's facial challenge to the constitutionality 
of the communications fraud statute falls within the 
ambit of the "pre-plea constitutional violations" 
mentioned in Parsons. 781 P.2d at 1278. 
Therefore, the State argues that because Defendant's 
challenge is nonjurisdictional in nature, it was 
waived by his guilty plea. Defendant asserts that 
"pre-plea constitutional violations," id, encompass 
violations involving such things as Miranda 
admonitions and search warrants, and that a facial 
constitutional challenge to a statute is, at its heart, a 
jurisdictional issue. Therefore, Defendant argues 
that his challenge was not waived by his guilty plea. 
[6][7][8] **5 "Subject matter jurisdiction is the 
power and authority of the court to determine a 
controversy and without which it cannot proceed." 
Thompson v. Jackson, lA'i P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 
Ct.App.1987) (per curiam). Subject matter 
jurisdiction "can neither be waived nor conferred by 
consent of the accused. Objection to the 
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jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter may 
be urged at any stage of the proceedings, and the 
right to make such an objection is never waived." 
James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570 (Utah 
Ct.App.1998) (quotations and citations omitted). 
When subject matter jurisdiction is an issue, "[i]t is 
the duty of this court to 'satisfy itself not only of its 
own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in 
a cause under review.1 " EEOC v. Chicago Club, 86 
F.3d 1423, 1428 (7th Cir.1996) (quoting Mitchell v. 
Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244, 55 S.Ct. 162, 79 L.Ed. 
338 (1934)). [FN2] 
FN2. Instead of focusing on whether 
subject matter jurisdiction exists in a 
particular context, Judge Bench relies on 
Utah cases generally describing 
jurisdiction of our courts of general 
jurisdiction. The issue squarely presented 
in this case has not been addressed by Utah 
courts. 
Our jurisprudence, however, is no stranger 
to the concept that a court with general 
jurisdiction over a particular claim may or 
may not have subject matter jurisdiction 
over that claim. Although not directly 
analogous to the case at bar, perhaps the 
best example involves claims against 
governmental entities. There is no 
question that courts of general jurisdiction 
in Utah have jurisdiction over those 
claims. This notwithstanding, however, 
Utah appellate decisions have repeatedly 
held that the failure to strictly comply with 
the statutory requirements for claims 
against governmental entities deprives 
those courts of subject matter jurisdiction 
over such claims. See, e.g., Greene v. 
Utah Transit Auth, 2001 UT 109,ffi[ 
16-17, 37 P.3d 1156; Security Inv. Ltd. v. 
Brown, 2002 UT App 131,K 13, 47 P.3d 
97. 
[9][10] **6 "In general, a plea of guilty waives all 
nonjurisdictional defects, but does not bar appeal of 
claims that the applicable statute is unconstitutional 
or that the indictment fails to state an offense." 
United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1262 n. 
1 (9th Cir.1979). "Although a guilty plea waives all 
non[ ljurisdictional defects and fact issues, a 
vagueness challenge is a jurisdictional defect. 
Thus, following a guilty plea, a defendant could 
raise on appeal that he was prosecuted under an 
unconstitutional statute." United States v. Skinner, 
25 F.3d 1314, 1317 (6th Cir.1994) (quotations and 
citation omitted); see Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 
61, 62 n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 241, 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975) 
(per curiam) ("We simply hold that a plea of guilty 
to a charge does not waive a claim that— judged on 
its face-the charge is one which the State may not 
constitutionally prosecute."); Blackledge v. Perry, 
417 U.S. 21, 30-31, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 
(1974) (holding that guilty plea did not preclude the 
defendant from raising his constitutional claims 
because they "went to the very power of the State to 
bring the defendant into court to answer the charge 
brought against him"); United States v. Whited, 311 
F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir.2002) (addressing defendant's 
claim that the underlying statute was 
unconstitutional because it "properly f[e]ll within 
the narrow scope of review not barred by a guilty 
plea"), cert denied, 538 U.S. 1065, 123 S.Ct. 2234, 
155 L.Ed.2d 1121 (2003); United States v. Morgan, 
230 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir.2000) (recognizing 
that a claim that a statute is facially unconstitutional 
is a jurisdictional claim not waived by a guilty 
plea); United States v. McKenzie, 99 F.3d 813, 816 
(7th Cir.1996) (addressing defendant's argument on 
appeal after his guilty plea because he made "the 
only argument *737 available to him by asserting a 
jurisdictional challenge based on the 
constitutionality of the underlying statute"); United 
States v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 885 n. 1 (7th 
Cir.1996) ("[The defendant] entered his guilty plea 
without preserving his constitutional challenge[ to 
the underlying statute] for appeal. However, the 
government has expressly declined to raise a waivei 
argument, citing United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495, 
496-97 (7th Cir.1995) (challenge to 
constitutionality of statute of conviction is, in 
certain circumstances, jurisdictional claim nol 
waived by guilty plea)."); Bell, 70 F.3d at 496-97 
(addressing defendant's challenge to the 
constitutionality of the underlying statute after 
recognizing the principle that such a challenge "is a 
jurisdictional claim which is not waived by the 
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guilty plea"); United States v. Palacios-Casquete, 
55 F.3d 557, 561 (11th Cir.1995) ("A guilty plea ... 
does not waive the right of an accused to challenge 
the constitutionality of the statute under which he is 
convicted."); Mariano v. Kincheloe, 915 F.2d 549, 
552 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that the defendant "did 
not waive his constitutional attack on the 
[underlying] statute by pleading guilty"); United 
States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir.1989) 
(stating that although the dividing line between 
constitutional claims that are waived by a guilty 
plea and those that survive the plea is not 
"crystal-clear," "[c]laims that 'the applicable statute 
is unconstitutional or that the indictment fails to 
state an offense' are jurisdictional claims not waived 
by the guilty plea" (quoting Broncheau, 597 F.2d at 
1262 n. 1)), amended by 907 F.2d 115 (9th 
Cir.1990); United States v. Barboa, 111 F.2d 1420, 
1423 n. 3 (10th Cir.1985) ("A plea of guilty ... does 
not bar a claim that the defendant may not 
constitutionally be convicted in the first instance.... 
If [the defendant] plefaded] guilty to something 
which was not a crime, he is not now precluded 
from raising this jurisdictional defect, which goes 
'to the very power of the State to bring the 
defendant into court to answer the charge brought 
against him.' " (quoting Blackledge, 411 U.S. at 30, 
94 S.Ct. 2098)); United States v. Hill, 564 F.2d 
1179, 1180 (5th Cir.1977) (per curiam) 
(recognizing that "a guilty plea does not bar an 
appeal that asserts that ... the charge is 
unconstitutional"); United States v. Tallant, 547 
F.2d 1291, 1295 n. 5 (5th Cir.1977) (recognizing 
that a claim based upon "the unconstitutionality of 
the statute underlying the indictment" was an 
"appealable issue[ ] following a ... guilty plea"); 
United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 978 n. 8 (5th 
Cir.1975) (recognizing "that after entering ... a plea 
of guilty, a defendant may only appeal jurisdictional 
defects in the proceeding below, such as ... the 
unconstitutionality of the statute underlying the 
indictment"); Mercado v. Rockefeller, 502 F.2d 
666, 672 (2d Cir.1974) ("[I]t is clear that [a] guilty 
plea waives only nonjurisdictional defects and does 
not waive the right to contest the constitutionality of 
the statute that is the basis for a conviction." 
(second alteration in original) (quotations and 
citation omitted)); United States v. Cox, 464 F.2d 
937, 941 (6th Cir.1972) (recognizing that "[a] 
defendant who has pleaded guilty is not barred from 
claiming ... that the statute under which he was 
charged is unconstitutional" (quotations and citation 
omitted)); 1A Charles Alan Wright, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 175 (3d ed. 
1999) ("[T]he preclusive effects of guilty pleas do 
not apply to constitutional claims that go 'to the 
very power of the State to bring the defendant into 
court to answer the charge brought against him.' A 
defendant who has pleaded guilty may still contend 
... that the statute under which he was charged is 
unconstitutional." (quoting Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 
30, 94 S.Ct. 2098) (footnotes omitted)). 
**7 Because a facial challenge to the 
constitutionality of a statute directly cuts to "the 
power and authority of the court to determine a 
controversy," Thompson, 743 P.2d at 1232, it is 
necessarily a jurisdictional matter. Accordingly, an 
unconditional guilty plea does not operate as a 
waiver of a facial constitutional challenge to a 
statute, because such a challenge is jurisdictional in 
nature. [FN3] *738 Therefore, we address 
Defendant's arguments. [FN4] 
FN3. The justice court appeal process 
analog in Judge Bench's opinion is 
somewhat puzzling. 
Since justice courts are not courts of 
record, traditional appellate review is 
generally unavailable or severely limited. 
This notwithstanding, the Utah 
Constitution guarantees "the right to 
appeal in all[ criminal] cases." Utah 
Const, art. I, § 12. In City of Monticello v. 
Christensen, 788 P.2d 513 (Utah 1990), 
our supreme court ruled that the trial de 
novo appellate procedure now set out in 
Utah Code Annotated section 78-5-120 
(2002) satisfied this constitutional 
mandate. See Christensen, 788 P.2d at 
518-19. Following a trial de novo, 
traditional appeal therefrom is available 
only if "the district court rules on the 
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(7). 
In our view, this unique process for 
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obtaining review of justice court 
proceedings has nothing to do with issue 
preservation or waiver of nonjurisdictional 
constitutional claims by voluntary guilty 
plea— section 78-5-120 makes no reference 
to either. Indeed, if anything, it is a 
recognition of the importance of claims 
involving the constitutionality of statutes 
or ordinances, specifically contemplating 
such challenges in the court of record in 
the first appeal. Under the statutory 
scheme, raising the constitutional 
challenge to the statute or ordinance is the 
method by which jurisdiction is conferred 
on appellate courts to entertain further 
appeals, the defendant having already been 
accorded his or her constitutional right of 
appeal from the justice court by trial de 
novo in a court of record. This is a far cry 
from the ability to challenge subject matter 
jurisdiction in an initial appeal of right. 
FN4. The State argues that Myers v. State, 
2004 UT 31, 94 P.3d 211, both addresses 
and disposes of the issues herein. The 
appellant's claims in Myers were based 
upon the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, 
see id. at Tf 10; and, to the extent the 
appellant alluded to constitutional defects 
in a statute, his challenge was not facial. 
Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court 
characterized his argument as based on an 
"allegedly incorrect legal interpretation [of 
a rule of law]," and never addressed or 
ruled upon the effect of a facial 
constitutional challenge. Id. at \ 17. 
II. Constitutional Challenge 
**8 Defendant argues that the communications 
fraud statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and 
vague. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (2003). 
We consider each of his arguments in turn. 
A. Overbreadth 
[11][12][13] **9 "In considering whether a statute 
[is overbroad], a court's first task is to determine 
whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount 
of constitutionally protected conduct." In re I.M.L., 
2002 UT 110,1[ 1 5, 61 P.3d 1038 (quotations and 
citations omitted). We examine "criminal statutes 
... with particular care; those that make unlawful a 
substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
conduct may be held facially invalid even if they 
also have legitimate application." Id (quotations 
and citations omitted). However, "[o]nly a statute 
that is substantially overbroad may be invalidated 
on its face." City of Houston v. Hill 482 U.S. 451, 
458, 107 S.Ct 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987). 
Overbreadth "must not only be real, but substantial 
as well." Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 584, 
122 S.Ct. 1700, 152 L.Ed.2d 771 (2002) 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
[14][15][16] **10 When interpreting the 
challenged language, "we look to the statute's plain 
language and presume that the legislature used each 
term advisedly." In re I.M.L., 2002 UT 110 at f 
16, 61 P.3d 1038. "Statutory language is overbroad 
if its language proscribes both harmful and 
innocuous behavior." Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 
P.2d 1259, 1263 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (quotations 
and citations omitted). The communications fraud 
statute prohibits 
devis[ing] any scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money, 
property, or anything of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, 
promises, or material omissions, and 
communicat [ing] directly or indirectly with any 
person by any means for the purpose of executing 
or concealing the scheme or artifice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). Defendant 
posits that the communications fraud statute is 
overbroad "because it permits criminal prosecution 
and sanctions in every case involving a 
communicationf ] that could be construed as 
dishonest." Specifically, Defendant argues that the 
communications fraud statute does not require an 
intent to defraud, and that it criminalizes innocuous 
behavior because "[a]s long as there is an artifice, a 
false communication in any form made for the 
purpose of executing the artifice, and a desire to 
obtain anything of value, the elements of the 
communications fraud statute are met." Defendant 
also alleges that the modes of communications 
prohibited *739 in the communications fraud statute 
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are similarly overbroad and prohibit constitutionally 
protected conduct. See id. § 76-10-1801(6). We 
disagree. 
[17] **11 First, the communications fraud statute 
does not prohibit all false "pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions," 
only those where an individual seeks "to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money, property, 
or anything of value." Id. § 76-10- 1801(1). 
Second, it requires proof that the false or fraudulent 
"pretenses, representations, promises, or material 
omissions made or omitted were made or omitted 
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless 
disregard for the truth." Id § 76-10-1801(7). While 
the First Amendment may value some falsehoods 
for their contribution to public debate, see New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n. 
19, 84 S.Ct 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), it has not 
given protection to malicious statements that were 
made "with knowledge that [they were] false or with 
reckless disregard of whether [they were] false or 
not." Id. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710. The 
communications fraud statute draws the distinction 
between criminal and innocent behavior with a 
similar mens rea, and thus, it cannot be said that it is 
"substantially overbroad" and should be 
"invalidated on its face." Hill, 482 U.S. at 458, 107 
S.Ct 2502. Accordingly, we conclude that the 
communications fraud statute is not overbroad on 
its face. 
B. Vagueness 
[18] [19] **12 Defendant argues that the 
communications fraud statute is unconstitutionally 
vague in its use of the terms "artifice," 
"communicate," and "anything of value." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), (6)(a). "The 
void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute 
or ordinance define an offense with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand 
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that 
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement." Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265 (quotations 
and citations omitted). However, because the 
communications fraud statute "implicates no 
constitutionally protected conduct," Defendant must 
show that it "is impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications." Village of Hoffman Estates v. 
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 
494-95, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). 
[20][21][22] **13 Defendant argues that the term 
"artifice," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), is 
defined too broadly and would encompass any form 
of deceit so that ordinary persons would not know 
whether the deceit was prohibited. While not 
defined in the communications fraud statute, 
"artifice" is commonly understood to mean "an 
artful stratagem," or a "trick." Webster's New 
Collegiate Dictionary 106 (9th ed.1986). Black's 
Law Dictionary defines "artifice" similarly as "[a] 
clever plan or idea, especially] one intended to 
deceive." Black's Law Dictionary 108 (7th 
ed.1999). Additionally, we do not read the term 
"artifice," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), in a 
vacuum, but rather as it relates to the other terms 
within the communications fraud statute. See 
Bowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50,U 8, 94 P.3d 915 
(stating that "[s]ubsections of a statute should not be 
construed in a vacuum but must be read as part of 
the statute as a whole" (alteration in original) 
(quotations and citation omitted)). Contrary to 
Defendant's assertions, the communications fraud 
statute does not prohibit all artful stratagems and 
tricks, only those meant to, inter alia, defraud 
others. While the term "artifice," Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-1801(1), may be construed broadly, "a statute 
is not unconstitutionally vague because it is broad." 
State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). 
We conclude that the term "artifice," Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), is used with "sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand 
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that 
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement." Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265 (quotations 
and citations omitted). Therefore, we conclude that 
the term "artifice," as used in the communications 
fraud statute, is not unconslitutionally vague. Utah 
Code Ann. §76-10-1801(1). 
[23] **14 Defendant next argues that the term 
"communicate," Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-1801(6)(a), is vague because it is "given the 
broadest possible definition" under the *740 
communications fraud statute. The communications 
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fraud statute prohibits "communicat[ing] directly or 
indirectly with any person by any means for the 
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or 
artifice." Id. § 76-10-1801(1). Additionally, it 
specifically states that to communicate "means to 
bestow, convey, make known, recount, impart; to 
give by way of information; to talk over; or to 
transmit information." Id. § 76-10-1801(6)(a). 
Defendant's argument is unavailing. Although 
"communicate," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(6)(a) 
, is broadly defined, this does not necessarily make 
the term unconstitutionally vague. See Wareham, 
772 P.2d at 966. Indeed, the communications fraud 
statute does not seek to punish those who keep an 
artifice or scheme to themselves. Defendant fails to 
demonstrate how "ordinary people can[not] 
understand what conduct is prohibited," Lopez, 935 
P.2d at 1265 (quotations and citations omitted), and 
therefore, fails to demonstrate that the term 
"communicate," as used in the communications 
fraud statute, is unconstitutionally vague. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(6)(a). 
[24][25] **15 Finally, Defendant argues that the 
phrase""anything of value," Utah Code" Ann. § 
76-10-1801(1), is unconstitutionally vague because 
it is undefined and left open to a variety of 
interpretations. Defendant proffers numerous 
hypothetical situations in an attempt to illustrate the 
vagueness of the phrase "anything of value." Id. 
However, "speculation about possible vagueness in 
hypothetical situations not before the [c]ourt will 
not support a facial attack on a statute when it is 
surely valid in the vast majority of its intended 
applications." Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 733, 
120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000) 
(quotations and citation omitted). Defendant was 
charged under the communications fraud statute 
because he devised a scheme to defraud others of 
"money." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). We 
believe that "the vast majority of [the 
communications fraud statute's] intended 
applications," Colorado, 530 U.S. at 733, 120 S.Ct. 
2480 (quotations and citations omitted), will 
involve incidents where individuals have defrauded 
others of "money" or "property," Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10- 1801(1), both of which are terms that are 
sufficiently understood to allow ordinary citizens to 
determine what conduct is prohibited. See Lopez, 
935 P.2d at 1265. Additionally, because Defendant 
was charged with devising a scheme to defraud 
others of "money," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) 
, his actions do not fall within the "anything of 
value" realm, id, and thus, he may not challenge 
this phrase as unconstitutionally vague. See Village 
of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n. 7, 102 S.Ct. 
1186 ("One to whose conduct a statute clearly 
applies may not successfully challenge it for 
vagueness." (quotations and citation omitted)). 
[FN5] 
FN5. In his brief on appeal, Defendant 
states that "[ajrguably, this is precisely the 
type of conduct the communications fraud 
statute was intended to prohibit." 
**16 Defendant's constitutional challenge to the 
communications fraud statute fails. We conclude 
that the communications fraud statute is neither 
unconstitutionally overbroad, nor unconstitutionally 
vague. 
CONCLUSION 
**17 A facial challenge to the constitutionality of 
a statute is jurisdictional in nature and, therefore, 
we conclude that Defendant's facial challenge to the 
constitutionality of the communications fraud 
statute is not barred by his voluntary, unconditional 
guilty plea. However, in considering Defendant's 
facial challenge to the communications fraud statute 
on overbreadth and vagueness grounds, we 
conclude that it is not unconstitutionally overbroad 
or vague. Accordingly, we affirm Defendant's 
conviction. 
ORME, Judge (concurring): 
**18 I concur in the court's opinion. I write 
separately to explain my position, because I 
recognize the lead opinion represents a departure 
from the general prohibition against raising issues 
for the first time on appeal, especially in the face of 
a guilty plea. 
**19 For me, the easy proposition is this: Subject 
matter jurisdiction is an issue that may be raised by 
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either party or the court at any time. So far as I am 
aware, there is no exception to this rule for guilty 
pleas. See *741 James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 
570 (Utah Ct.App.1998) ( "[Subject matter 
jurisdiction] is derived from the law. It can neither 
be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused. 
Objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the 
subject matter may be urged at any stage of the 
proceedings, and the right to make such an 
objection is never waived.") (internal quotations & 
citation omitted), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 
1999). 
**20 In this sense, the lead opinion's analogy to 
sovereign immunity cases is actually pretty good. If 
a plaintiff sued the State without giving the required 
presuit notice, and the State did not raise the lack of 
notice as a defense below, it would presumably not 
be permitted to raise the lack of notice for the first 
time on appeal in challenging a judgment that had 
been entered against it. However, if giving the 
presuit notice is necessary to vest the court with 
subject matter jurisdiction, then of course the lack 
of notice could be raised for the first time on 
appeal. And indeed, giving presuit notice strictly in 
compliance with the sovereign immunity statute has 
been held to be a matter of subject matter 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Greene v. Utah Transit Auth, 
2001 UT109,K 16,37 P.3d 1156. 
**21 While this kind of subject matter jurisdiction 
issue usually arises in civil cases, the concept is the 
same in criminal cases. If a guilty plea is entered, 
and no issues are reserved for appeal consistent 
with State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988), then unless the guilty plea is set 
aside as involuntary, all issues are waived on 
appeal, except subject matter jurisdiction, which 
can never be waived. See James, 965 P.2d at 570. 
Thus, if a 32-year-old defendant was charged with 
murder in juvenile court and pled guilty, on appeal 
to this court he most certainly could challenge the 
lack of the juvenile court's subject matter 
jurisdiction over an adult charged with murder, see 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-104, -105 
(Supp.2003)—even if the guilty plea was otherwise 
proper and he never raised the jurisdictional 
problem below. The same is true if a defendant 
pled guilty to the "crime" of blasphemy, and no 
such criminal offense were on the books in Utah. If 
he pled guilty, and did not raise below the point that 
no such crime existed in Utah, he still could 
challenge his conviction by raising, albeit for the 
first time on appeal, the lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. And obviously he would succeed. The 
trial court simply would lack the judicial power to 
convict the defendant of a nonexistent crime. 
**22 Here is where it gets admittedly more tricky: 
Suppose our criminal code made it a felony to 
commit the crime of blasphemy, defined as 
"disparaging the one Almighty God or questioning 
His existence." If a defendant pled guilty to that 
offense, did not preserve a constitutional challenge 
for appeal under Sery, and did not raise the 
constitutionality issue below, could he raise for the 
first time on appeal the facial unconstitutionality, 
under the First Amendment, of the statute 
criminalizing blasphemy? At one level, it seems 
that charges brought pursuant to such a statute 
would be just as much a nullity as charges brought, 
as in the immediately preceding hypothetical, in the 
complete absence of any blasphemy statute. In 
simplest terms, in this country there simply could be 
no crime of blasphemy-amy statute purporting to 
provide otherwise would be facially 
unconstitutional. But he could not raise this 
constitutional challenge for the first time on appeal 
unless facial unconstitutionality goes to subject 
matter jurisdiction. [FN1] Does it? I am not 
completely sure, although I can see that, in concept, 
an unconstitutional statute is as ineffectual as no 
statute. 
FN1. Judge Bench points out such an 
argument could be reached under the plain 
error doctrine. Maybe. But the rescue 
opportunity provided by the plain error 
doctrine is rather limited. As hereafter 
shown, the ability to claim plain error can 
itself be waived. In contrast, subject 
matter jurisdiction can never be waived. 
In the blasphemy hypothetical, if facial 
unconstitutionality is a matter of subject 
matter jurisdiction, it could be addressed 
for the first time on appeal even if plain 
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error was not raised, see State v. All Real 
Property, 2004 UT App 232,f 13 n. 7; 
was inadequately raised, see State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) 
(holding that if any of the requirements for 
plain error are not met, "plain error is not 
established" and cannot be raised); or was 
raised too late. See Coleman v. Stevens, 
2000 UT 984 9, 17 P.3d 1122 (holding 
court would not reach unpreserved issues 
under plain error doctrine because plain 
error raised for first time in reply brief). 
*742 **23 This is what ultimately explains my 
vote in this case: No Utah appellate court has 
squarely answered the question of whether a 
challenge to a criminal statute based on facial 
unconstitutionality goes to subject matter 
jurisdiction. The lead opinion cites a multitude of 
cases that have held it does; Judge Bench's opinion 
cites no case that has addressed the question and 
held it does not. [FN2] It is admittedly somewhat 
counterintuitive for me that a substantive conclusion 
of unconstitutionality- even facial 
unconstitutionality-defeats subject matter 
jurisdiction, but that seems to be the prevailing 
view. Accordingly, with some trepidation, I concur 
in the court's opinion. 
FN2. I disagree with Judge Bench's claim 
that Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, 94 P.3d 
211, considered this question and rejected 
it on the merits. The Myers court 
described the jurisdictional argument 
asserted in the case as being "somewhat 
convoluted." Id. at \ 15. Later, the Court 
characterized the argument as being 
tantamount to a "claim[ ] that the trial 
court's decision constituted an 'erroneous 
application of the law.' " Id at f 17 
(citation omitted). In any event, the 
Court's dismissal of the jurisdictional 
argument in Myers was premised on the 
simplistic notion that " '[a] court has 
subject matter jurisdiction if the case is 
one of the type of cases the court has been 
empowered to entertain by the constitution 
or statute from which the court derives its 
authority,' " id. at If 16 (citation 
omitted)--an obvious overstatement as 
readily shown by the sovereign immunity 
example, i.e., district courts have general 
civil jurisdiction and even jurisdiction over 
disputes against the State, but lack subject 
matter jurisdiction over such a case if the 
presuit notice is flawed in some way. 
Another example of the overbreadth of the 
pronouncement in Myers is the fact that 
appellate courts have the constitutional and 
statutory power to consider appeals, and 
yet are held to lack subject matter 
jurisdiction over appeals that are untimely. 
See Utah Const, art. VIII § 3 ("The 
Supreme Court shall have appellate 
jurisdiction over all other matters to be 
exercised as provided by statute ...."); id. 
§ 5 ("The jurisdiction of all other courts, 
both original and appellate, shall be 
provided by statute."); Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3) (2002) (specifying Supreme 
Court's appellate jurisdiction); id. § 
78-2a-3(2) (specifying appellate 
jurisdiction of Court of Appeals); 
Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 161 
P.2d 569, 571 (Utah Ct.App.1989) ( 
"[Fjailure to file an appeal within the 
required time limit deprived the court of 
subject matter jurisdiction.") (citing 
Watson v. Anderson, 29 Utah 2d 36, 504 
P.2d 1003, 1004(1973)). 
The very best indication that the Myers 
court simply did not have before it the 
issue we must decide—at least not in any 
kind of cogent, well-developed way—is 
that the only authority cited in Myers is 
two decisions from the Utah Court of 
Appeals and the statute giving the district 
courts original jurisdiction of "all matters 
civil and criminal," subject to certain 
limitations. Myers, 2004 UT 31 at \ 16, 
94 P.3d 211 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 
78-3-4(1) (2002)). The Myers opinion did 
not acknowledge, much less did it treat, the 
extensive state and federal jurisprudence 
categorizing the facial unconstitutionality 
of a criminal statute as being a matter of 
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subject matter jurisdiction-^ virtual 
impossibility if the argument had actually 
been made and was well-supported, as in 
the instant case. 
BENCH, Judge (concurring in the result): 
**24 I do not necessarily disagree with the main 
opinion's analysis of the constitutionality of the 
communications fraud statute. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-1801 (2003). But, because of the 
procedural posture of this case, I would rule that we 
cannot reach the issue under controlling Utah law. 
[FN1] 
FN1. Given the clarity of the Utah law, 
decisions from the federal courts are not 
helpful. Nor are the federal cases even 
consistent with each other. See, e.g., 
United States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 
552 (9th Cir.1989) amended by 907 F.2d 
115 (9th Cir.1990) ("The dividing line 
between the majority of constitutional 
claims waived by a voluntary plea of 
guilty, and those that challenge the right of 
the state to hale the defendant into court, 
and thus survive the plea ..., has not been 
crystal-clear."). 
**25 As recognized by the main opinion, 
Defendant entered an unconditional guilty plea to 
three counts of communications fraud. Cf State v. 
Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct.App.1988) 
(allowing defendants to enter conditional pleas 
preserving the right to appeal any specified pretrial 
ruling). In the district court, Defendant never 
challenged the constitutionality of the statute. Nor 
did he enter a conditional plea to preserve his right 
to appeal the constitutionality of the 
communications fraud statute. See id. Furthermore, 
Defendant never filed a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,f 3, 
40 P.3d 630 (requiring defendant to file a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea within thirty days after the 
entry of the plea before defendant can challenge the 
validity of the guilty plea on appeal). Instead, 
Defendant filed a notice of appeal directly from his 
sentence. Now, for the first time, Defendant 
attempts to raise the issues of *743 overbreadth and 
vagueness as constitutional challenges to the 
communications fraud statute. He claims he can do 
so because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be 
waived and that the district court lacked jurisdiction 
to convict him of violating an unconstitutional 
statute. 
**26 This approach reflects a basic 
misunderstanding of jurisdiction. The Utah 
Supreme Court recently explained subject matter 
jurisdiction very succinctly as follows: "A court has 
subject matter jurisdiction if the case is one of the 
type of cases the court has been empowered to 
entertain by the constitution or statute from which 
the court derives its authority." Myers v. State, 
2004 UT 31,K 16, 94 P.3d 211 (other quotations 
and citation omitted); see also Salt Lake City v. 
Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 852 (Utah 1994) ("Subject 
matter jurisdiction is 'the authority and competency 
of the court to decide the case.1 " (citations 
omitted)). 
**27 The main opinion contends that a facial 
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is 
necessarily a jurisdictional matter because the 
inherent constitutionality of a statute affects whether 
a court has the power and authority to decide the 
issue. However, without a proper challenge, courts 
must presume the constitutionality of a statute. 
Statutes are presumed to be constitutional until 
the contrary is clearly shown. It is only when 
statutes manifestly infringe upon some 
constitutional provision that they can be declared 
void. Every reasonable presumption must be 
indulged in and every reasonable doubt resolved 
in favor of constitutionality. 
Jones v. Board of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53, 
If 10, 94 P.3d 283 (quotations and citations 
omitted). Thus, because the communications fraud 
statute was not challenged below, it is presumed to 
be constitutional, and the district court had 
jurisdiction. 
**28 In footnote two of the main opinion, my 
colleagues attempt to find support for their 
extraordinary decision by pointing to the distinction 
between general jurisdiction and subject matter 
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jurisdiction. As noted by the main opinion, we do 
not focus "on whether subject matter jurisdiction 
exists in [this] particular context" because, unlike 
claims made against governmental entities-which 
require compliance with the Immunity Act-the 
communications fraud statute at issue here requires 
that nothing be done, by either party, before 
criminal defendants can be prosecuted and courts 
can exercise subject matter jurisdiction. With 
claims against a governmental entity, "the 
legislature has explicitly declared how, what, when, 
and to whom a party must direct and deliver a 
Notice in order to preserve his or her right to 
maintain an action against a governmental entity." 
Greene v. Utah Transit Auth, 2001 UT 109,^ 15, 
37 P.3d 1156. Thus, "[compliance with the 
Immunity Act is necessary to confer subject matter 
jurisdiction upon a trial court to hear claims against 
governmental entities." Id at ^ 16. In the instant 
case, as with presumably every other criminal 
prosecution, the charging statute does not explicitly 
declare what must be done before subject matter 
jurisdiction is conferred. Thus, the district court 
had general jurisdiction as well as subject matter 
jurisdiction due to an absence of legislative 
requirements or limitations. [FN2] 
FN2. In an attempt to bolster the main 
opinion's reasoning, the concurring opinion 
discusses some rather bizarre 
hypothetical. First, the 
thirty-two-year-old defendant charged with 
murder in juvenile court. Thankfully, this 
potential calamity has already been 
resolved by our legislature. See Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-3a-104, - 105(l)(a) (2002) 
(detailing jurisdiction of juvenile courts). 
By contrast, our legislature has not limited 
the jurisdiction of district courts in a 
similar manner. See Utah Code Ann. § 
78-3-4(1) (2002) ("The district court has 
original jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal, not excepted in the Utah 
Constitution and not prohibited by law."). 
Second, the criminal defendant who pleads 
guilty to the nonexistent crime of 
blasphemy. If no such crime of blasphemy 
existed, then we would not indulge in the 
presumption that a nonexistent, unwritten 
statute was constitutional. Here, however, 
a statute does exist, and, until challenged, 
we must presume it to be constitutional. 
Third, if a defendant pleaded guilty to the 
theoretical crime of blasphemy, and did 
not preserve his constitutional challenge, 
then he could raise the challenge for the 
first time on appeal by arguing plain error. 
A plain error challenge could easily be 
made without making the facial 
constitutionality of a statute a prerequisite 
to subject matter jurisdiction. 
As for the concurring opinion's statement 
that "[n]o Utah appellate court has 
squarely answered the question of whether 
a challenge based on facial 
unconstitutionality goes to subject matter 
jurisdiction," our supreme court has 
squarely addressed the question. In Myers 
v. State, 2004 UT 31, 94 P.3d 211, the 
Utah Supreme Court explained that even 
when Myers argued, for the first time on 
appeal, that the wholly and facially 
unconstitutional aggravated murder statute 
divested the trial court of jurisdiction, he 
had "failed to state any legitimate 
jurisdictional defect" because ,f[t]he Utah 
Code provides that 'the district court has 
original jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal, not excepted in the Utah 
Constitution and not prohibited by law.' " 
Id at H 16 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 
78-3- 4(1)). The instant case is no 
different. Thus, even when Norris argues, 
for the first time on appeal, that the 
communications fraud statute is facially 
unconstitutional, and that such 
unconstitutionality goes to the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the district court, he 
fails "to state any legitimate jurisdictional 
defect." Myers, 2004 UT 31 at H 16, 94 
P.3d211. 
*744 **29 Therefore, if Defendant wanted to 
challenge the constitutionality of the 
communications fraud statute, he had to do so first 
in the district court. See, e.g., State v. Pugmire, 
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P.2d 271, 272 (Utah Ct.App.1995) ("Although 
[defendant] raises the issue on appeal, he did not 
challenge the constitutionality of this statutory 
scheme before the trial court. As a general rule, we 
will not consider issues-including constitutional 
issues—initially raised on appeal."); State v. Webb, 
790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah Ct.App.1990) ("As the Utah 
appellate courts have reiterated many times, we 
generally will not consider an issue, even a 
constitutional one, which the appellant raises on 
appeal for the first time."). 
**30 This rule applies with equal force to facial 
challenges to a statute made for the first time on 
appeal. In State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 
(Utah Ct.App.1991), when a, facial challenge to a 
criminal statute was raised for the first time on 
appeal, this court addressed Archambeau's 
challenge only for the "plain error" and 
"exceptional circumstances" arguments he made. 
See Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 922, 926. Defendant, 
in the instant appeal, asserts no claim of plain error 
or exceptional circumstances. 
**31 Allowing defendants to raise constitutional 
challenges for the first time on appeal will logically 
necessitate overruling a large body of jurisdictional 
jurisprudence involving Utah's justice courts. See, 
e.g., City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 
513, 517 (Utah 1990) ("[T]his Court [has] 
repeatedly held that a person dissatisfied with a 
justice court decision could appeal that decision to a 
district court and that the district court decision was 
final unless the validity or constitutionality of a 
statute was at issue, not on appeal, but in the lower 
court."); Draper City v. Roper, 2003 UT App 312, 
f 2, 78 P.3d 631 (per curiam) (" 'The decision of 
the district court [from a hearing de novo following 
a justice court's ruling] is final and may not be 
appealed unless the district court rules on the 
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.' " 
(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(7))); South 
Salt Lake City v. Terkehon, 2002 UT App 405,1f 6, 
61 P.3d 282 ("Utah case law clearly provides that 
neither this court nor the Utah Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction to hear an appeal from proceedings in 
the district court held pursuant to an appeal from 
the justice court unless the issues raised in the 
justice court involve[ ] the validity or 
constitutionality of an ordinance or statute." 
(quotations and citations omitted)); City of Kanab 
v. Guskey, 965 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Utah Ct.App.1998) 
("[Historically, Utah appellate courts have never 
had jurisdiction to hear appeals of district court 
decisions after a de novo trial on appeal from an 
unfavorable justice count judgment, absent the 
raising of a constitutional challenge in the justice 
court."). The practical consequence of the main 
opinion is that defendants will now be allowed to 
challenge the constitutionality of a statute in this 
court, for the first time, without ever having 
bothered to raise the issue in either justice or district 
court. 
**32 Having failed below to challenge the statute 
on grounds of overbreadth and vagueness, and 
having failed on appeal to argue either plain error or 
exceptional circumstances, Defendant is now 
precluded from challenging the constitutionality of 
the communications fraud statute. I would therefore 
affirm based on Defendant's failure to preserve his 
constitutional challenge. 
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pleading guilty (pfno contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading gu&fy (orido contest/are: 
n\ y ^ f i> TVt^g> or- (Jon QJZ$J< i ^ f \A 
La. 
I miderstand that by pleadmg-g^^LLwill be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above. (Or, if I am pleaaUng^ne-etffrtp^ I am not contesting that I committed the 
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, u I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute oi 
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons foi 
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty 
(9rjftQd£fiolest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (01 
J o contest): - ^ \ T v 
U/*4k_ ^h^ ^V-T»^AN*JM*JV< 0>v^ «=l f i m t ^ < u J_ -fkjua\ ( A v u ^ o^a* 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I pleac 
guilty (qfticTcoSest) F)vill give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if 3 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understanc 
that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed 
lawyer's service to me. 
I (have not) (have; waivea my right to counsel If I have waived my right to counsel, 
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that 
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the 
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is >£#** C* IMint^woc 
My attorney an^-Lfewe fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of 
my guilty (o^no c o i ^ ^ plea(s). 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by a n j ^ ^ i a l 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty fefriocontes^^ 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a 
trial, a) I would have the right to see and obseiye the witnesses who testified against me and 
b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to 
cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses 
if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony 
of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would 
pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to 
have a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose 
uot to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also 
know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal 
to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty 
[or<gg^ontes^^)am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged 
Drime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my 
sase will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each 
element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt If the trial is before a jury, the verdic 
must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or(no contes^Hrgive up the presumption ol 
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury 01 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the 
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs forme. I understand that I am giving up 
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (gfno contes^^understand that if I wish 
to appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is 
entered. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty {or No Contest)PJfea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest), I knov/ that by pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving 
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or 
both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five peicent (85%) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of 
a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run 
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each 
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing 
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no 
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was 
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be 
inappropriate. 
Plea agreement My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of 
a plea agreement between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and 
provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those 
explained below: 
J^k^. GJ^^vwdt 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
-ecommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges 
x>r sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they 
relieve the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful 
nfluence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or 1 have had it read to me by iny attorney, and I 
mderstand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to 
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes 
because all of the statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am ijt5years of age. I have attended school through the / y grade. I can read 
md understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which 
tfould impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the 
nfluence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
inderstanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
lisease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing 
>r from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must 
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand 
that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be 
made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest I will only be allowed to withdraw 
my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any 
challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Dated this * day of ^^*ve*J~e)r , 2±*% 
DEFENDANT 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for ^Ccht-^Jl lU^r t -vY
 > the defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe'that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent To the best of my knowledge and belief 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of 
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are 
accurate and true. 
yOTORNE Y FOR DEFENDANT 
Bar No. fokg^ 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
^ _ I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
/^(cJ^e^tM AJ'ry-i's , defendant I have reviewed this Statement of 
Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct No improper inducements, threats, or coercion 
to encourage a plea has been offered defendant The plea negotiations are fully contained 
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on-the record before 
the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the 
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the 
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public intent. 
^ PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
B a r N o . / O Y O a — 
Order 
Based on the facts Set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representatiojis in court; the Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, 
knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the 
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this ? day of S ^ p / e ^ ^ * - , 2^°3. 
D1S1RICTCOUK1 JUDCiJb 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
The parties agree to the following settlement terms and conditions in relation to State v. j 
hardNorris, case no. 971008355: \ 
1. Defendant will enter a plea of no contest to two counts of attempted 
ummications fraud, a class a misdemeanor. The communications supporting the two / 
nts are (1) the newspaper advertisement run in the spring of 1993; and (2) the in-person 
rting with the victim(s) which culminated with the signing of agreements. The artifice \ 
ised to defraud the victims was to foil tnerc aomty to comply with contract agreements and I 
i sue and obtain judgments against them. 
2. Defendant agrees to waive all appellate rights in relation to the case with the exception 
Larrow issues of the constitutionality of the charging statute and jurisdictional issues 
viously raised with the Court and presently the subject of the appeal from judgment in the 
nth District Court case, which is presently on appeal 
3. The State agrees that any restitution at issue be properly left to civil remedies, 
hiding the results of law suits previously filed in relation to the facts and circumstances of the 
sent case. 
4. The State agrees that the proper sentence is to close the case with credit for time 
ved considering that the defendant has already served more than the maximum period of 
arceration allowed upon conviction for two class A misdemeanors. ^^^s 
Addendum E 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ERNEST W. JONES, 1736 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-




Screened by: E. Jones 





The undersigned Brook Plotnick - West Valley City Police Department, under oath states 
on information and belief that the defendant, committed the $rimgs of: 
C)^ 
Dmmitted tne «BL 
COUNT I 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a TSrird-^egre^Felony, at^592 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
INFORMATION 




COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense,'devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses,, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.08. \ 
COUNT III 4^^^(^ / 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a m d b e f e r ^ at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT IV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT VI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392,West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT VII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
INFORMATION 




COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT IX 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Randy Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT X 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Randy Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or materia] omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
INFORMATION 




COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a part} to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3^92 \\ est 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on oi about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party lo the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
lor the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
flic loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XIII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a Third Degree Ft loir , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March tliiuiiLjh June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Lemmon money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
INFORMATION 




COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Lemmon money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Francis money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XVI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Francis money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a imrci Degree Felony, ut i j * i west JDUU South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. MORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Bailey money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XVIII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, <u - ^ w est 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Bailey money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud., and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XVIIII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3jyi West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
INFORMATION 




COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Officer Brook Plotnick, S. Humphrey, B. Gessel, Joan Mattson, Sue Hunter, Kay Crosby, 
Mike Mabry, L. Stauffer, Kay Utley, S. Francis, O. Fowler, K. Noland, D. Duffin and S. 
Lebaron. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your Affiant bases this Information on police report #94-25376 and the following: 
1. During the Spring of 1993, the defendant ran an advertisement in the newspaper. 
The ad made certain promises and representations to those responding concerning employment 
and salary. Numerous people responded to the ad and met with the defendant. The defendant 
had each person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised. The 
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtained judgmients against many of 
these people. 
2. The defendant told several employees at his business that he never intended to 
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fulfill any of the promises in the ad. The defendant back dated checks and altered records to 
cover up this scheme. 
BROOK PLOTNICK 
Affiant 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
E. NEAL GUNNARSONy^istrict Attorney 
Deputy District Attorjafey 
May 15,1997 
msy/97006614 
Subscribed and sworn M l f e ^ f e * ^ 1' 
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Data Table for Initial Criminal Filing 
Prosecuting governmental entity: Salt Lake County 
Prior related cases: none 
Officer's Badge No. 8049 
Agency Case Number: 94-25376 
Arrest Date: 
Jail Booking Number: 
Defendant's Sex: Male 
Defendant's Social Security Number: 
Defendant's Driver's License Number: 8223961 
State Issuing Defendant's Driver's License: Utah 
Keith L. Stoney (38S8) 
City Prosecutor 
West Valley City 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
(801) 963-3331 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH (WVC) 
Plaintiff, 
NORRIS, RICHARD F. 




I N F O R M A T I O N 
Case No-^lOGMq^mCL; 
The undersigned, KEITH L. STONEY, under oath, states on 
information and belief that the defendant, on or about 12 MAY 1994, 
at the vicinity of 3392 WEST 3500 SOUTH, West Valley City, Utah, 
did unlawfully commit the crime(s) of: 
COUNT 1: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A" 
COUNT 2: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A" 
COUNT 3: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 7 6-10-1801, CLASS "A" 
COUNT 4: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A" 









OETECTIVF. PLOTNICX**PLEASE LET US KNOW IF THERE ARE ADDITION 
WITNESSES** 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Y o u r a f f i a n t b a s e s t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
WITNESSES STATED TO OFFICERS ^ . ^ ^ ^ ^ ' S K ? 
OCCASIONS, UNLAWFULLY DEFRAUDED ^ O T E E R O R B ° B T ^ A N S OF FALSE OR 
MONFY, PROPERTY, OR M T ^ ^ ™ ™ ^ M l l i s , OR MATERIAL 
•ppannULENT PRETENSES, R E P R E b b N 1 i r „ vf« TrmT-pprTTT WITH ANY PERSON 
BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ^ C O T I N S W* IN WEST VALLEY AND 
T H E R S O ^ THE CITY REQUESTS A WARRANTEE ARREST. 
Compla in 
94-25376, DR, H0RaiS.R2 
PTC: , 




























Case No. 971008355 
MOTION 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT"COURT - SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD FRANKLIN NORRIS, JR. 
Defendant. 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 19th day of 
November, 1997, th« auuve-entitled matter came on for 
hearing before the HONORABLE L.A. DEVER, sitting as Judge 
in the above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, 
and that the following proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
DEC - 2 2003 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ty 
ERNIE JONES 
Deputy Salt Lake County 
District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MICHAEL A. PETERSON 
Attorney at Law 
Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association 
424 East 500 South, #300 





ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 
COURTS 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. PETERSON: Judge, could we turn to the Richard 
Norris case, please? 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR* PETERSON: Judge, did you receive a copy of the 
latest order that came down from the Court of Appeals on this? 
That's why we asked you to—to look at it now. It just seems 
to me in light of the ruling, we can't really proceed. We're 
still waiting for the remittitur. They've now stayed it while 
he goes to the U.S. Supreme Court, so... 
It looks like the Utah Supreme Court denied his 
petition on September 27th and then he went to the Court of 
Appeals and—and indicated to them that he was going to 
petition the U.S. Supreme Court. And then I got that order 
that I just gave you on the 29th or 30th, indicating they've 
granted another stay so it can go to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
So, I'll assume that based upon this, that if we 
don't hear something from the U.S. Supreme Court, that on 
December the 29th, unless there's something given to the Court 
of Appeals, that we should hear from them after December the 
29th; is that your understanding? 
MR. PETERSON: That's generally our understanding, 
Judge, we would hear relatively soon from the United States 
2 
Supreltie Court on the issue of the writ of certiorari there. I 
take it from Mr. Jones' approach with that order, that he's 
asking the Court not to do anything• 
THE COURT: Well, I don't think I can do anything, 
Mr. Peterson. 
MR. PETERSON: Yeah. I think— 
THE COURT: I mean, that's the argument you'ye made 
in front of me before is, is that—that since there's no 
remittitur, I can't do anything. Now, I've got an order from 
the Court of Appeals saying they're staying remittitur. I 
don't think I can do anything* 
MR. PETERSON: Well, that's—that's almost correct. 
Actually, the first case, Judge, before you, ending in 5698, 
we did ask you to dismiss without prejudice and you went ahead 
and did that, based on the pending appeals process—appeals 
process. So, while your Honor is correct that we've used the 
remittitur argument, we have asked you to proceed on the 
narrow issues of jurisdiction and you have done that. 
There7a a companion case, 8355, which has a 
duplicate Information filed before your Honor to the 
Information filed in 5698. And consistent with what the Court 
has done in the past, we would ask you to at least reach the 
issue of our motiorj to dismiss without prejudice in 8355, 
given that the appeals process is ongoing in the W6st Valley 
prosecution and therefore, this Court is without jurisdiction 
3 
to allow the 8355 filing to stand. 
THE COURT: Mr. Jones, do you want to respond to 
that? 
MR, JONES: Well, yeah, I just—I don't—I don't 
think you can. There's no question you dismissed the one case 
in April while we were waiting for the remittitur. Then we 
got word from the Court of Appeals that they were dismissing 
the appeal, so we went ahead and re-filed. That's the case 
that's still pending. 
And what you said at that time is, it's okay to re-
file, but I'm going to hold the warrant until we get a 
decision from th$ Court of Appeals, so that's essentially 
where we are. And if— 
THE COURT: And that's the position the Court is 
going to take in this matter. 
MR. JONES: Okay. 
THE COURT: I'm not going to dismiss any more cases, 
I'm not going to entertain any arguments on any dases until we 
have the r^esolution on the appeals resolved; so, I don't want 
to have cases set in front of me again and arguments, because 
I'm not going to hear them until I have a remittitur back from 
the Court of Appeals. 
MR. JONES: Thanks, Judge. 
MR. PETERSON: That's all I have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
4 
Addendum F 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
FILED 
'•'•^ Court of Anpeafg 
MAR 2 6 1S97 
Case No. 960151-CA 
West Valley City, ) ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Richard Norris, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Orme. 
This matter is before the court pursuant to West Valley 
City's motion to dismiss its appeal, to which defendant objects, 
and pursuant to defendant's motion to stay this court's February 
18, 1997 order, to which West Valley City objects. 
West Valley Cicy seeks to dismiss its own appeal of the 
circuit court's order dismissing misdemeanor charges against 
defendant on the ground that the facts supported a felony charge, 
over which the circuit court did not have jurisdiction. 
Subsequently, the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office indicated 
its intent to file a felony charge in district court on the same 
facts. Since the circuit and district courts were consolidated 
in July, 1996, the district court now has jurisdiction whether 
the charges are filed as felonies or as misdemeanors. 
Defendant, through counsel, asserts that this appeal should 
not be dismissed because West Valley City will now file felony 
charges against him out of vindicniveness for his filing of a 
motion to dismiss in circuit court. However, even assuming the 
truth of these assumptions, that issue is not before this court 
and may be raised in a different appeal, if and when defendant is 
convicted of felony charges. There is simply no reasoned 
argument that West Valley City should not be allowed to dismiss 
its own appeal from the circuit court's decision. 
Defendant's pro se argument that this court should stay its 
own order directing him to file a response to the motion to 
dismiss by March 3, 1997 is without merit. The trial court does 
not have jurisdiction to consider defendant's latest motion for 
substitute counsel, and defendant's claim that counsel will not 
adequately represent him does not appear to be supported by the 
filings in this court. 
00785 
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's motion to 
stay is denied and this appeal is dismissed. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Gregory K^ r^irter^ uu 
